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ABSTARCT
The Palestine-Israeli “Peace Agreements” 
Between Challenges and Hopes
This study aims to explain the obstacles to settling the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 
focusing on the “peace process,” which was launched in 1991, and the agreements signed 
in 1993 and 1995 between the two parties, which were presumed to convert this perpetual 
conflict into a “just, lasting and comprehensive peace,” but resulted in a virtual standstill.
A critical analysis of the principles of the agreements, and an assessment of the 
challenging experience throughout the peace process echo the fact that the agreements 
did not solve the conflict with its limited, interim principles. And hence, recalling for the 
mobilization of international law, and implementation of UN Resolutions on the conflict, 
may contest the obstructions caused by the accords and compel the inauguration of a new 
epoch of peaceful coexistence for both nations on one land.
Key words: Palestine-Israel conflict, “Middle East Peace Process”, “Oslo Peace 
Agreements”
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ÖZET
Filistin-İsrail “Barış Anlaşmaları” 
Çelişkiler ve Umutlar arasında
Bu çalışmanın amacı, Filistin-İsrail sorunu çözümü için 1991'de başlatılan “Barış 
Süreci” ve iki taraf arasında 1993 ve 1995’te imzalanan ve bu süregelen sorunu “adil, 
kalıcı ve etrallı” bir barış’a dönüştürmesi umulan, ancak tam bir çıkmazla sonuçlanan 
anlaşmalar üzerinde yoğunlaşarak, bu sorunun çözümündeki engelleri incelemektir.
Anlaşma hükümlerinin eleştirel bir analizi ve barış sürecinde yaşanan zorlu 
deneyimin bir değerlendirmesi, anlaşmaların sınırlı ve ara çözümler öneren hükümlerinin 
sorunu çözmekten uzak kaldığı gerçeğini yansıtmaktadır.
Böylelikle, uluslararası hukukun yeniden harekete geçirilmesi ve bu sorun üzerine 
alınan BM kararlarının uygulanmaması anlaşmaların neden olduğu engelleri aşmayı 
sağlayabilecek ve her iki ulusun da tek bir toprak üzerinde barış içinde birlikte 
yaşayacağı yeni bir dönem açılmasını zorunlu kılabilecektir.
Anahtar sözcükler: Filistin-İsrail sorunu, Ortadoğu Barış Süreci, Oslo Barış
Anlaşmaları.
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Introduction
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been a crucial test case for the United Nations 
Organization, although it was among the first questions addressed by this organization.' 
Despite the Agreements to resolve the conflict, which are hailed internationally as the 
Peace Agreements, the “just, lasting and comprehensive peace” has not been achieved, 
considering the facts on the ground that reflect a disturbing reality different from the one 
addressed to settling the conflict.
A study of the strengths and weaknesses of the agreements and an examination of 
the relevance of UN Resolutions, on which the “peace process” was based, certainly 
requires a judgment for promoting more comprehensive resolutions. For instance, the 
implementation of UN resolutions that put forward the roots of the conflict, lay the 
foundation for the realization of Palestinian self-determination, and promote the 
obligations of both the State of Israel and the emerging Palestinian Authority in the 
Occupied Territories to inaugurate a new epoch of peaceful coexistence for both parties 
during a period of dramatic transition.
The core of this argument is presenting the historical background of the Palestine- 
Israeli conflict, and the obstacles to initiate a peace process, in order to outline the factors 
necessary to inaugurate a peaceful coexistence. Because the simple reality that this 
process is not working is due to the crucial issues it deferred to the last stage, and to the 
challenges of implementation, influenced by the global, regional, and individual 
circumstances which created the “peace process” in 1991. Moreover, these circumstances
influenced the dynamics of negotiations, which were imposed with two of the UN 
resolutions, and were diverted to new problems on participation and other technical and 
external interruptions. These new issues became the crux of negotiations; the meetings 
and negotiations became the goal, and not the means to achieve the peace process.
The bilateral and multilateral peace-making efforts, which began in Madrid 
“Middle East Peace Conference” in 1991, continued in Washington, D.C. Then in the 
spring of 1993, secret Israeli-PLO negotiations began in Oslo, Norway. Despite all the 
obstacles, an agreement was reached in the summer of 1993, and was signed on the 
White House lawn on September 13, 1993. It was followed by the Rabin-Arafat 
handshake that symbolized the significance of the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles 
(DOP) which had been signed that day. Israel and the PLO reached a number of 
agreements on economic and financial issues as well as the early empowerment of the 
Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and Jericho (the agreed areas for Palestinian Self- 
Rule).
Nevertheless, progress toward conciliation and peace was fraught with difficulties 
and complications as each issue endangered diseord and debate. The deficiencies of the 
principles of the agreements as well as the challenges of implementation all undermined 
the progress of the accords. This eventually drove the “peace process” into a virtual 
standstill, with each party claiming that the other failed to meet commitments on the 
agreements. However, assessment of the dramatic experience following the signing 
demonstrates that unless the crucial issues of settlements, Jerusalem, refugees, sell- 
determination, withdrawal from the occupied territories, and “independence of Palestine , 
are discussed and settled, the “just, lasting and comprehensive peace” remains unfeasible.
Thereupon, in chapter one, the dynamics of negotiations between the two 
parties—which led to the signing of these agreements, will be illustrated in light of the 
historical background of the conflict. Chapter two will be a critical reading of the 
agreements and an assessment of their principles and of the crucial issues that were 
deliberately postponed to the end of the peace process. In chapter three, the crux of 
implementation and the level of commitment will be clarified by reviewing the post-Oslo 
experience; an experience of instability and confrontation on several issues that will be 
identified.
In conclusion, it is unavoidable to looking forward to any alternative except to 
one that would indeed create the “just, lasting, and comprehensive peace.” Such an 
alternative is possible by the mobilization of international law and enhancing UN 
resolutions, which grant both parties equal rights that will finally inaugurate a new epoch 
of peaceful coexistence.
Chapter 1: Motives behind the Agreements 
And Dynamics of Negotiations
The road to the Middle East “peace process” launched in 1991 is a phase in the 
history of the Palestine-lsraeli conflict in which various challenges circumvented the 
process to a genuine peace. The core of these challenges is an extension from the 
historical background to the prospects for settling the conflict. Yet, global, regional and 
individual circumstances led to the inception of the process at Madrid in 1991 and 
influenced the dynamics of negotiations behind the signing of the agreements between 
Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1993 and 1995. Therefore, the 
understanding of the historical background to the conflict, with extension to the motives 
behind the signing introduces the obstacles to construct a genuine peace process that 
could settle the conflict.
1.1 Historical Background of the Palestine-lsraeli Conflict
The fact that there is no Palestinian territory to which the Palestinian people 
belong, is deeply rooted in every step forward on the part of Zionism, served by the 
imperialist powers. This started with excluding independence for Palestine in the secret 
Anglo-French agreement of 1916,' succeeded with assurances given by the British 
Government to the World Zionist Organization (WZO) to establishing a national home in 
areas in East Africa and Argentina as sites for the Jewish national home.^ However, the 
"Jewry’s tenacious yearning for Palestine as the only acceptable territory for a Jewish 
national home”,"^ resulted in what is known as the Balfour Declaration in November
1917. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, promised Palestine to the WZO due to 
“the strategic advantage of gaining a new ally that would help guard the Suez Canal.
Although a commission appointed by President Wilson, during the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919 mentioned that “to making Palestine distinctly a .lewish State [would 
be] a serious injustice,”  ^after three decades the Balfour declaration was implemented in a 
radically transformed Palestine. Anti-Semitism and the Nazi Persecution of European 
.lewry escalated the immigration of Jews to Palestine.
The British census of 1922 showed a population of 757,182 of whom 83,794 were 
Jews.^ Although “Palestine was fully inhabited by 94% being Palestinian Muslims and 
Christians and less than 7% Jews,”* the Zionists justified their vision and plans through 
their famous slogan “a land without a people for a people without a land.” Palestinians 
were not successfully able to face this imperialistic plan and were defeated in 1948, and 
the name Palestine that existed as a well-defined unit until 1948 had to be eliminated.
By international law, the UN resolution 181, on 29 November 1947, called for the 
partition of Palestine. The resolution called for the end of the British Mandate and the 
partitioning of Palestine into two independent states, an “Arab State” and a “Jewish 
State” joined by an economic union. The city of Jerusalem was to be put under a separate 
international regime. This resolution determined that the Jewish State would have more 
than 55% of the Palestine territory, despite the fact that Jews made up only one-third of 
the population in 1947, and would include major Palestinian population centers and the 
richest coastal agricultural land.'^
Palestinians rejected the partition plan, because while terminating the British 
Mandate, the international community accepted the transition to another one. Moreover,
the partition was arithmetically erroneous because it did not take the figures and 
proportions of population and ownership of land into consideration. I'lie .lewish State was 
to include the most fertile plane and the Mediterranean coast, while the Arab State was 
assigned mountains and arid regions of Palestine. On the other hand, Israel accepted only 
one element of the plan, which called for the establishment of a .lewish state. The other 
elements, which have never been accepted by Israel, include:
1. The creation of an Arab state, whose boundaries are specified.
2. The creation of a special international zone, encompassing the Jerusalem 
metropolitan area. A detailed map of the international zone of the city of 
Jerusalem is part of the resolution.
3. J’he adoption of a constitution for the Jewish state.
4. The creation of an economic union and a joint Economic Board for the two 
states.
5. No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State shall be 
allowed except for the public purposes.
6. Palestinian citizens ... as well as Jews and Arabs, who do not hold Palestinian 
citizenship, reside in Palestine ... shall ... become citizens of the State in 
which they are resident.
7. Jaffa should be an Arab enclave in the Jewish State.
The Refugee Crisis
The creation of Israel led to the displacement of over 700,000 Palestinian refugees 
in 1947 and 1948 and the subsequent loss of a huge amount of land and other property." 
“An especially bloody, terrorist incident was a Zionist attack on the Arab village of Deir 
Yasin near Jerusalem. The village which had tried to avoid embroilment in the fighting 
lost 255 men, women and children in the Zionist attack. Reprisals followed with an Arab 
attack on a Jewish convoy with 77 killed.”’^
The first Arab-Israeli war created about three-quarter of a million homeless 
Palestinian Arabs. The British estimated in February 1949 that about 320,000 
Palestinians moved into, or already resided in, the eastern section of Palestine, which was
controlled by the Arab Legion and Transjordan. Approximately 210,000 moved into 
camps in the Gaza region, 100,000 into Lebanon, and 75,000 to Syria. Some refugees 
went to Egypt and others to Iraq. Some 150,000 remained within the established Jewish 
State.
No one in 1948 viewed the refugee problem in long-range terms. Neither Israel 
nor the Arabs, at least for many years, did very much toward finding a solution. The 
United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) tried to alleviate the refugees’ 
immediate situation. On December 11, 1948, UNGA passed Resolution 194 establishing 
a Palestine Conciliation Commission, to facilitate the repatriation or compensation of 
Palestinian Arab refugees.However, in practice, these refugees remained in exile and 
have thus become the victims of an international neglect of duty to protect their identity 
as bearers to the right to self-determination in the area proposed for an Arab State as 
defined in the plan of Partition.
Several issues distracted attention from the problem of the future of Palestine, and 
the fate of these refugees, such as the emergence of oil in the Arab world, the increasing 
involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle Eastern affairs, added to the 
nationalization of the Suez canal in 1956.
The rise of PLO in 1964
The 1960s marked a period of struggle for national liberation and the end of 
colonial regimes in many parts of the world. Palestinians understood that tears could 
neither liberate their homeland, nor feed their refugee families. Mr. Yassir Arafat and his 
loyalties set out to shape the Palestinian people as a national community. He founded Al
Fatah in 1956. Then under the sponsorship of the Arab League in 1964, the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) was established and appeared to be the embodiment of 
national aspirations to large numbers of Palestinians. This put the Palestinians on the 
world map again.
Between 1948 and 1967, Palestinian communities on the border of Israel were 
exposed to constant war. During and immediately after the 1967 War, a second wave of 
refugees moved outward from the West Bank in the face of Israeli occupation, to the 
West Bank of the Jordan River. A smaller group moved away from the Golan Heights as 
that area was occupied.
Out of this disaster, in November 1967 came the Security Council Resolution 242, 
speaking of Palestinians only as refugees and deliberately ignoring that Palestinians are 
people who have rights to self-determination. Nevertheless, the PLO accepted 242 so 
long as it was not isolated from, but taken in conjunction with the other UN resolutions 
that recognized Palestinian rights.''’
After the 1967 War, Israeli occupation extended to the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan 
Heights, and all of historical Palestine. However, the possession of new armed forces and 
weapons by some Arab countries after 1967, coupled with the PLO advocacy of armed 
struggle and Palestinian self-reliance, all effected Israel’s adequacy in protecting Western 
interests in the region, and of those who supported the establishment of Israel.
After the 1973 War, the UN resolution 338 came out to face the fate of the 
previous resolutions. Palestinians did not accept this resolution as it indicated that every 
state in the area should live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, which 
does not any way mean the Palestinians since they did not have a state.
The Palestinian National Council, then, called for an independent State on any 
portion o f historic Palestine. In February 1969, “the PLO proposed to Israel that a joint, 
secular, democratic state be created in Palestine. This plan was to be utopian and was 
rejected.”'^  As Abba Eban, Israel’s ambassador to the UN, recorded; “[there is] no need 
to run after peace. The armistice is sufficient for us. If we run after peace, the Arabs will
demand a price from us -  borders [that is, in terms of territory] or refugees [that is,
18repatriation] or both. Let us wait a few years.”
/
In March 1982, Israel invaded South Lebanon, where the PLO had built a social 
and military infrastructure. Israel completed the destruction of Beirut, killed thousands of 
innocent civilians under rocket attacks, in order to strip Palestinians of their national 
identity and their newly formed national history. The outcome of this invasion dispersed 
the PLO into eight Arab countries, with Yassir Arafat establishing new headquarters in 
Tunis.These confrontations between Israel and the Palestinian Lebanese forces resulted 
in inflation in Israel 400% recovered by US financial aid of US$4 billion at once.'“ The 
American support to Israel extended to the US veto right in Israel’s favor ever since.
In the late 1980s, the historical uprising —intifada— of the Palestinian youth 
facing the Israeli army, with stones being felled by bullets, stunned Israel and the whole 
world. The intifada’s goal involved an end to Israel’s military occupation, recognition of 
the Palestinian people’s right of self-determination, agreement that the PLO should 
represent Palestinian interests in any political settlement, the eventual establishment of a 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, also the evolution of the idea of a secular, 
democratic, two-state solution. Only one of these goals was achieved which was 
recognition of the PLO.
1.2 Imperatives for ending the Palestine-Israeli Confliet
All the above mentioned events not only disinclined the competence of Israel in 
surviving among adversary neighbors, but also in protecting Western interests in the 
region, which made Israel a burden on the West. The United States, for example, was not 
willing to finance a defeated army— defeated in the sense of not achieving its full 
objectives. The US Secretary of State, James Baker, in 1989 gave a speech to the Israelis 
telling them “You have to search for another realistic perspective. If this army is not 
defensible, your objectives can not be achieved.” This led to a re-consideration of the 
Israeli policy, as described by Shimon Perez in his book about the Middle East, that “we 
[Israel] have to build the ‘economic Israel’ instead of ‘Greater Israel.’”' “ Even earlier, 
with the Shamir government, Israel had already moved towards a change. In 1986 there 
were clandestine talks between the PLO and Israel. However, these talks did not achieve 
anything and did not last long.
1.3 The Road to the “Peace Process”
The global changes in the early 1990s created the conditions for a negotiated 
settlement in the Middle East. In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
destruction of Iraq reshaped the strategic balance in the Middle East.
Internationally, the collapse of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe, and of the 
Soviet Union in particular, removed what for the PLO had been a historic counterweight 
to the imperial and pro-Israeli designs of the United States in the region. The Soviet 
collapse also prompted massive Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel with 390,682 Soviet
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Jews settling there and in the territories in the years 1990-92.^’ On the other hand the 
1991 Gulf War’s impact on the expulsion of Palestinians by Kuwait after the Iraqi 
withdrawal, revealed the fact that lacking statehood, these expelled Palestinians had no 
where to go.
Moreover, the end of the Cold War ended the financial and diplomatic support 
from Moscow to Palestinians vis-à-vis Israel. A new world order started headed by the 
United States who initiated this peace process, due to its certain interests and preferences 
concerning the outcome of the process. These preferences were “predicated on the 
assumption that the US has a title to the Arab world’s petroleum resources, a privileged 
access to its markets and waterways,”"'* after normalization between Israel and the Arabs 
is totally achieved.^^ As ally and protector of Israel, the US was simply unable to credibly 
discharge its self assigned mission as the catalyst for peace. This pattern is rooted in a 
special relationship, transformed into a strategic alliance during a period of three decades, 
which witnessed a convergence of US strategic interests with Israeli territorial ambitions.
On 6 March 1991, George Bush announced his four-point initiative to solve the 
Middle East problem: implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338; the acceptance of the 
principle of ‘land for peace’; the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and peace 
and security for the State of Israel.^*’
Although the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people” were not in the context 
of Resolutions 242 and 338, and although there was no indication about the UN 
resolutions that set out the Palestinian rights, Mr. Arafat immediately welcomed the 
contents of these initiatives due to several reasons. These reasons were in particular his 
declining leadership and marginalization in Tunis as well as the rise of autonomous
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leadership in the West Bank and Gaza during the Intifada. He accepted the imposing US 
settlement, which specifically avoided taking into account, for instance the UN 
Resolutions 181 or 194, that stipulate Palestinian right to statehood and repatriation of the 
refugees.
For Israel, this was the first time since the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt that a 
number of Arab states seemed ready to conclude peace. It was, also, an opportunity for 
Israel to normalize and integrate with its neighborhood, as well as to free itself from US 
pressure on economic leverage. The settlement of the question of Palestine became the 
main issue for Arabs to re-stabilize the region after the Gulf War. Although the War had 
demolished the official Arab consensus on Palestine, eroded Arab solidarity, and revealed 
insecurity in the region, the settlement of the question remained among the main issues.
Palestinian intentions towards reconciliation emerged in the early 1970s, when 
Arafat declared the establishment of Palestine on any liberated land, as well as in the 
proclamation of the PLO’s acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, and the implicit 
recognition of Israel in 1988. However, Israel’s response was marginal and not official, 
coming from the Israeli left.
One Palestinian motivation for peace was the immense result of the years of 
uprising, which had claimed and maimed thousands of children, women, and men as its 
victims.Moreover, during the 1991 Gulf War, Arafat’s support for Saddam Hussein 
caused a financial and diplomatic disaster for the PLO. The combination of these 
circumstances gradually led Arafat to decide that a dramatic move was required to rescue 
the PLO from collapsing. Palestinians had assumed that their rights, enshrined in UN 
resolutions, would somehow supersede the essence of the peace process. Such changes ol
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attitude concerning the parties to the conflict helped to accept the idea of a regional peace 
conference sponsored by the US.
1.4 Inceptions of the Process
Meetings and negotiations between the Israelis and Arabs including Palestinians, 
to resolve the crux of their perpetual conflicts, created new obstacles and problems. The 
Palestinian representation at the peace conference was the first problem facing this 
process. In order to negotiate with the Palestinians, Israel conditioned its attendance on 
the Palestinians’ participation as part of a Jordanian delegation that excluded members of 
the PLO, residents of East Jerusalem and diaspora Palestinians. Israel had demanded that 
the PLO should reinstate its recognition of Israel in clear and uncertain terms, renounce 
terrorism, and reject several controversial sections of the PLO Covenant.^*
This indicates that Israel had no intention to recognize the Palestinians as a 
sovereign nation, but only as a delegation whose attendance was necessary to resolve the 
Middle East conflict. The Palestinians, for their part, felt it was essential to expand their 
delegation to include representatives from East Jerusalem and the diaspora. However, 
they accepted the principle of a joint Jordano-Palestinian delegation, provided that the 
Palestinian component was on an equal footing with the Jordanian one, and that it 
received a separate invitation.^^ They insisted on clear recognition of the PLO, but did not 
demand a similar renunciation of terrorism from Israel.
However, the denial of recognizing the Palestinians as a nation was more obvious 
as the settlements were expanding in the occupied territories. In July 1991, Israeli 
settlement boosted. Israel asked the United States for $10 billion worth of loan housing
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guarantees.^® President Bush urged the Congress to defer consideration of the new Israeli 
aid until January 1992, and Prime Minister Shamir was warned that Israel’s loan request 
would be rejected unless Israel agreed to freeze its settlement activities in the occupied 
territories.
In September 1991, Baker met with Israeli and Palestinian leaders to review 
conditions for the parties’ participation in the Middle East peace talks. Baker described 
the Madrid Conference as talks that would be followed by direct negotiations to end the 
state of war between Israel and its neighbors. His attempt was to reach a compromise, 
which would eventually lead to Palestinians’ self-determination and, as it was based on 
resolution 242, would also end occupation from the lands occupied in 1967.
On 30 October 1991, the Madrid Conference was held, bringing together Israel, 
the Palestinians, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. The conference marked an important 
breakthrough in that it was the first public, official meeting between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors. By marrying bilateral and multilateral peace-making efforts, it was 
conceptually different from previous attempts to resolve the conflict.^'
The Madrid conference began ceremonially with a three-day session by 14- 
member official delegations. The Jordanian/Palestinian delegation had 14 representatives 
respectively. The Palestinians also sent a six person advisory team that had no official 
standing, but coordinated policy with the PLO. Some Palestinians considered that as a 
progressive achievement.
President Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev opened the conference. Bush called for 
peace based on security for Israel and fairness for the Palestinians. He said, “territorial 
compromise is essential for peace” and that only direct talks between Israelis and Arabs
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could bring peace; the superpowers could not impose it.^  ^ Israeli Prime Minister Yitzahk 
Shamir recounted the history of the Jews and argued that the cause of conflict was not 
territory but Arab refusal to recognize the legitimacy of Israel ”  He did not mention the 
occupied territories or Israeli settlements. Palestinian delegation head, Haidar Abd al- 
Shafi, asserted that the Palestinians were willing to live side by side with the Israelis and 
accept a transitional stage, provided it led to sovereignty. He called on Israel to give the 
displaced Palestinian refugees, of 1967, the right to return and to stop settlements. "^* 
Jordan’s Foreign Minister, Kamal Abu Jaber, rebutting a common Israeli view, declared 
that Jordan has never been and will not be Palestine.^^
The opening session was followed by bilateral negotiations between Israel and 
each of the Arab delegations. The conference was an important step on the road to peace 
in that it involved direct, bilateral, public and official peace negotiations between Israel 
and its Arab neighbors.^^ The negotiations in Madrid scheduled the implementation of 
Palestinian self-governance for October 1992. However, this did not happen because of 
several obstacles. In Madrid, bilateral negotiations between the parties to the conflict 
created new obstacles to a discussion on peace and on the territories’ future. For example, 
Shamir proposed to the Arabs ‘peace for peace’ not ‘land for peace’. He mentioned his 
regret “if the talks focus primarily and exclusively on territory.”^^  He suggested that this 
was the quickest way to an impasse. On the other hand, the Palestinian delegation 
considered the settlements in occupied territories illegal, and insisted on linking its 
acceptance of the concept of an interim period, preceding final status negotiations, to an 
Israeli decision to come to terms with Israel’s legal status in the West Bank and Gaza.^ ** 
Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians were conducted in phases.
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beginning with talks on interim self-government arrangements, with the objective of 
reaching agreement within one year. Once agreed, the interim self-government 
arrangements were to last for a period of five years, beginning the third year of the period 
of interim self-government arrangements. Negotiations were to take place on permanent 
status on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338. Israeli negotiators continually focused on 
the specifics of Palestinian self-government -  such as the nature of an ‘autonomous’ 
authority, its structure and legislative power -  while avoiding any discussion of 
substantive issues such as the applicability of UNSCR 242 to the process or the idea of 
transition from the ‘interim’ period of Palestinian self-government’ to a final status 
settlement.^^
Subject to this provision, the Palestinians’ acceptance of autonomy was a major 
concession on their part and one which they agreed to only as a temporary measure to 
overcome the obstructions and ensure the success of the negotiations. By adopting this 
policy, the Palestinians demanded, in return for their concession of accepting autonomy 
as a national phase, a halt to Jewish settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, 
thus preventing Israel from exploiting the time required for negotiation and the autonomy 
period by continuing its ‘Israelization’ of these territories and from making the potential 
outcome of the negotiations essentially meaningless.
Bilateral negotiations began in Madrid and continued in Washington, D.C. 
between Israeli and Syrian, Lebanese, and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegations. At the 
same time a series of multilateral talks began to make some progress in defining and 
addressing the technical issues within their purview. In December 1991, the Washington 
summit conference was held between Arab and Israeli negotiators. The US did not
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intervene to mediate the discussions. The Shamir government’s tactics of intransigence 
continued between Madrid and Washington: new settlements were created in the 
occupied territories, and the settlers occupied more Palestinian houses in East 
Jerusalem."^ ® Moreover, Yitzhak Shamir made more statements hostile to territorial 
concessions and to the creation of a Palestinian state. His government authorized Jewish 
settlers in the occupied territories to form an armed militia to enforce its will even in 
Palestinian villages. On 2 January 1992, a new Israeli budget was adopted which 
provided for the construction of 5,000 new housing units in the occupied territories'"
The bilateral talks in Washington moved ahead at a slow pace in 1992. Although 
the bilateral discussion had no meaningful progress, none of the parties involved in the 
talks dropped out so as not to be held responsible for a deadlock in the process. The 
Palestinians discovered that their jurisprudence of the Palestine question, based largely on 
international law, was not the same jurisprudence that Israel was willing to apply. Nor 
was it the same jurisprudence that governed the Madrid process.
Consequently, all the Palestinians could do was to struggle to prove that they had 
rights, but they were blamed by the US administration for being unrealistic at the talks. 
“The US administration suggested that they focused on specific proposals rather than 
present general schemes that were part of an overall plan.”'*^ Shimon Peres also accused 
the Palestinian “team”, for being “disorganized and incapable of making even the most 
jYjjjiQj. without referring to Arafat in Tunis for instruction. The confeience was
closed after brief rounds of talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors and the 
Palestinians of the occupied territories.
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1.5 Obstructions halting the process
The peace process was brought to a halt by Israel’s deportation policy of Hamas 
activists. The Rabin government, on 17 December 1992, deported 413 Palestinians 
affiliated to Hamas for a one-year period, exiling them to the no-man’s-land just north of 
Israel’s Lebanese “security zone”. Their expulsion led to international condemnation and 
another Security Council resolution censuring Israel. “The UN Security Council 
unanimously condemned the action taken by Israel, and demanded that Israel, the 
occupying power, ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied territories of 
those deported.”"''' This action immediately scuttled the post-Madrid negotiations in 
Washington, and pitched the territories into their worst period of violence since the
intifada.
Under US pressure, Israel modified the expulsion orders, permitting a few 
deportees to return and scheduled a phased repatriation of the others.^^ In light of 
subsequent political developments and agreements reached with the US administration, 
the PLO then decided to return to talks in Washington. Yet, the Palestinian delegation to 
Peace Talks, presented the following conditions/questions to resume the talks.
• Since the reference in UNSCR 242 to the land occupied by Israel in 1967, is 
there any reason to question the fact that the land is actually occupied, hence 
subject to the principle of withdrawal?
• Since the term “occupied territory” as used by the US refers to the West Bank, 
including Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, is there any reason for violating the 
territorial integrity of the land or fragmenting it?
• Since the US does not recognize Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and the 
expansion of its municipal boundaries or any other illegal unilateral act to 
change the status of Jerusalem, is it not imperative on the US then to prevent 
Israel from carrying out such actions, particularly the settlement activities in 
and around the city of Jerusalem, and the city’s siege and isolation as a form 
of de facto annexation?
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• Should not East Jerusalem be part of the interim self-government 
arrangements [instead of leaving] the fate of the whole city to be determined 
in the final status negotiations?
• Since the purpose of interim phase negotiations is to bring the occupation to 
an end and to effect the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority from Israel 
to the Palestinians, does this not mean the establishing of a genuine self- 
governing authority with legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, and not 
just partial functional or executive tasks?
• Since the settlement activities are not illegal (by international law and 
international humanitarian law) but also obstacles to peace, as well as being 
unilateral actions that violate the terms of reference and preempt the final 
outcome, should the US accept such actions or allow Israel to continue their 
perpetuation knowing that they threaten to sabotage the whole peace process?
• Since the US position continues to be that this process should achieve the 
legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people, how does the US define 
these rights?"**^
Despite the fact that these questions were crux of the conflict, the US responded 
in a Draft of “Israeli-Palestinian Joint Declaration of Principles”, suggested that the 
Palestinian interim self-governing authority had functional rather than territorial 
jurisdiction. The US offered different versions of the draft proposals on the Palestinian 
authority in occupied territories. Meanwhile, clandestine meetings between Israel and the 
PLO started in Oslo, Norway.
The Oslo channel, a series of 14 secret meetings between PLO officials and Israeli 
government advisors and academics began in late January 1993 and stretched over to the 
next eight months. These meetings were hosted and facilitated by Norway’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Johan Jorgen Holst and social scientist Terje Rod Larsen."*^  Out of these 
meetings the Oslo accords were bom.
In 1993, the Knesset lifted the ban on Israeli contacts with the PLO. Once the ban 
on the contacts was lifted—the next day -  talks began in earnest in Oslo. It was this 
secret Norwegian mediation that secured the Declaration of Principles between the two
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adversaries. They started to negotiate the Declaration of Principles to guide the 
negotiations on an interim self-government authority.
The two sides agreed on the interim period, that the Palestinian Interim Self- 
Government Authority would exercise its territorial jurisdiction in the occupied territories 
that were not under Israeli control on June 4, 1967 including Jerusalem.'*  ^ During their 
February 1993 meetings, both parties agreed on the Gaza Strip. In fact, the agreement on 
Gaza was not an achievement of the negotiating process, since for many years Israel’s 
leaders from both the Likud and the Labor government had spoken of the need to 
withdraw from the Gaza Strip. David Ben Gurion had described “Gaza [as] a cancer that 
every healthy body must get rid of it to prevent it from spreading.’’'^  ^So, to get ‘Gaza out 
of Tel Aviv’, it was necessary to get Israeli troops out of Gaza. Since Hamas guerrillas 
were killing Jews, and Hamas was strong in Gaza, ‘separation’ from Gaza would mean a 
separation from ‘terror,’ especially that few Israelis had any kind of ideological 
attachment to Gaza, unlike areas of the West Bank and Jerusalem. Even Rabin, in an 
unguarded moment in December 1992, mused before an American Jewish delegation that 
he wished Gaza would ‘disengage itself from Israel and then ‘sink’ into the
Mediterranean.
However, the PLO pointed that the first phase of the agreement must signal in 
tangible terms that the self-government would be taking effect on the West Bank and not 
just in Gaza.^' The Palestinians could not accept Gaza alone, and they demanded Arab 
east Jerusalem, and the heart of the occupied West Bank. The Israelis refused, and then 
settled on the poor quiet, but ancient city of Jericho as the seat of the Palestinian
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government. Some Palestinians considered this achievement a victory, while others were 
disappointed.
The Palestinian delegation went to the talks armed with the negotiating plan 
adopted by the political leadership during the previous rounds, with the aim of reaching 
agreement on a “declaration of principles”. With the start of the talks, agreement was 
reached on forming working committees for land and water. However, it became clear to 
the Palestinian delegation that Israel was still relying on its old tactics in dealing at the 
negotiating table. “The Israeli negotiator uses three languages: the first, behind the 
scenes, which is very generous; the second, at the negotiating table, which is more 
cautious; the third, on the document, which is extremely intransigent and hard-line.”„ 5 2
1.6 Inception to Oslo I
August 1993 was a critical month for the negotiations that took place during that 
time and ended in a serious crisis. After specifying the points of disagreement, such as 
final status, the withdrawal of the Israeli military government, and Israel’s 
responsibilities regarding security control of bridges, the dialogue moved on to the 
question of mutual recognition. At the end of their meetings and negotiations, the two 
parties signed the first agreement of the Declaration of Principles on 13 September 1993.
Letters of recognition were signed almost three weeks after the PLO-Israeli draft 
Declaration of Principles (DOP) was initiated in Oslo in August 1993, and finalized in 
Paris by the same Israeli and PLO negotiators who had worked out the DOP. The letters 
opened the way for the signing of the final agreement on 13 September 1993. The letters 
were on plain paper without letterheads (an Israeli requirement because of the two
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parties’ unequal status). In the exchange of these letters, Israel recognized the PLO but 
qualified that recognition by limiting the context to the task of representing only those 
Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza in the talks to be held within the 
framework of the Madrid process. The PLO, on the other hand, granted full recognition 
to the State of Israel. This recognition, however, was not conditional on ending the 
occupation or allowing the Palestinians to exercise sovereign rights in the territories.
The Declaration of (DOP) was an agenda of items that Israel and the PLO agreed to 
discuss within the context of peace settlement.
And yet, the text of the agreement was signed at the White House following the 
Israeli-PLO mutual recognition by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Perez and PLO 
Executive Committee member Mahmud ‘Abbas. The final agreement was identical to the 
draft, prepared by the US, except for one change, added just before the ceremony: in the 
preamble, the words “the Palestinian team’’ changed to read “the PLO team (in the 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference.
1.7 Conclusion
After the inception of the process at Madrid, it became clear that regional and 
global imperatives, mainly the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union had created 
a meeting point between Israel and the PLO. However, negotiations between the two 
parties, based on the principle of ‘land for peace’ and UN Resolutions 242 and 338, were 
diverted to new problems on participation and other technical and external interruptions. 
Hence, meetings and negotiations became the goal and not the means to achieve the 
principles of the process. Accordingly, a Declaration of Principles, that is hailed as the
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‘Oslo I Peace Agreement,’ was signed in 1993 to set out basic principles and a timetable 
for negotiations concerning both the establishment, for a transitional period, of a 
Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority in the Gaza Strip and the town of Jericho, 
and for the negotiations on ‘permanent status’.
And yet, while the core of the conflict is the problem of nationhood, of land and 
of legitimacy, the outcome of negotiations was an interim agreement whose aim was to 
create the right conditions for further negotiations. The following chapter will elaborate 
and assess the agreed and the disagreed principles between the two parties.
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Chapter 2: The Agreed and the Disagreed Principles 
Of the Peace Agreements
The road from Madrid to Washington to Oslo and then to Cairo has spelled 
number of Agreements between Israel and the PLO: the Declaration of Principles (known 
as Oslo I/DOP) on 13 September 1993, the Cairo Agreement on 4 May 1994 and Oslo II 
on 28 September 1995.
The Declaration of Principles is an agenda for negotiations, covering a five-year 
‘interim period’. The plan aims to establish an interim self-government authority in the 
form of an elected council in the West Bank and Gaza, which would provide a peaceful 
and orderly transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinians. It further aims to create 
the right conditions for negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories. The 
formulae based on two UN resolutions emerged in the DOP was further developed in 
Oslo 11.
2.1 Principles of Oslo I
The Declaration of Principles introduced new elements that included international 
observation of the future election, the granting of legislative authority to the council, and 
permitting Palestinians who live in East Jerusalem to participate in the election process. 
The agreement sets forth a speedy timetable for Palestinian self-rule (Article III and 
annex I). Although the core of conflict with Israel had always been land, specifically (and 
after the PNC of 1988, officially) the territories occupied in 1967, the issue of 
territoriality in the DOP was deeply ambiguous. '^* The Declaration lacks the clarity of a
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map’ although this was what most Palestinians had insisted that the peace process was all 
about; it only provides the commitment of a calendar. What was new in the Declaration 
was the procedure for Palestinian autonomy, especially Israel’s pledge to redeploy from 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho as the ‘first step’.
The declaration elaborates on the conduct of general elections in the territories in 
order to create a self-governing council whose function is to carry out the interim 
arrangements. It also outlines an array of responsibilities for each side. Under the plan, 
the Palestinians would govern their own affairs in all spheres of daily life and provide for 
their own internal security. Israel, for its part, would retain responsibility for external 
defense as well as the security of Jewish settlements and Israeli civilians. The debate over 
elections sets up what will probably be the most significant political struggle of the 
interim period. Either Israel will succeed in imposing on the Palestinians an autonomy 
whose primary goal is to secure Israel’s security and territorial interests, or the 
Palestinians will manage to wrest the rudiments of a law-based democratic polity to resist 
the Israeli vision and lay the bases for future national sovereignty.
The status of Jerusalem is to be unchanged throughout the five-year period of 
interim self-rule, but is to be raised in the course of negotiations on the permanent status 
of the territories. However, the agreement leaves no doubt that Israel would not forsake 
its demand that Jerusalem remains its undivided capital under Israeli sovereignty.^^
On the positive side, the arrangements over water (Article 6 and annex II) are 
remarkable for tangible measures of cooperation, including the principle of 
‘transboundary water-transfers”, which the annex further specifies. The ‘average annual 
quantities give Israelis approximately 80 percent and Palestinians 20 percent of the West
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Bank water. Israel succeeded in forcing the Palestinians to accept the right of water 
“management” alone, and the same amount of water as was supplied to the Gaza Strip in 
the past, provided that for 28 years Israel enjoyed exclusive control over the sources of 
water west of Jordan River.
2.2 The Disagreed/Postponed Principles
The framework of the Peace deal left all matters relating to sovereignty outside 
the scope of negotiations for the interim phase. Thus discussion of major issues such as 
Jerusalem, the still expanding settlements, and land issues were to be deferred for several 
years, as well as the final condition of the Palestinian entity without any guarantee for 
establishing an independent Palestinian State at the final stage.
2.2.1 Self-Determination
It is striking that the Declaration does not mention self-determination, either 
directly or explicitly, or indirectly; the only two UN texts to which it adverts are the 
famous Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and none of them mention self- 
determination. Only a vague reference to the Palestinian right to self-determination might 
be extracted from Article III (3), where reference is made to ‘the realization of the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements’. However, by itself 
this clause is enigmatic with regard to the final granting of self-determination to the 
Palestinians.
For internal self-determination, the Declaration in Article III (1 and 3) stipulates
that:
1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza strip may
govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general
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political elections will be held for the Council [of the Palestinian Interim Self- 
Government Authority] under agreed supervision and international observation, 
while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.
3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the 
realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just 
requirements.
Yet, the Declaration is silent about external self-determination, in particular on 
whether the Palestinians will attain independent statehood, or some form of association 
with one of the existing States (e.g., Jordan or even Israel), or both^ *^ . However, various 
provisions stipulate that the primary goal of the Declaration is to lead to the attainment of 
a ‘permanent status’ through the aforementioned Security Council resolutions.
These resolutions’ fundamental objectives are the following:
I. the ‘establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East’
II. the ‘withdrawal of Israel armed forces’ from occupied territories as a 
consequence of the ‘inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war’
III. ‘respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every State in the area
IV. ‘a just settlement of the refugee problem’.
In order to attain these objectives, some sort of independent international status 
for the Palestinians needs to be established. Hence, the final status of the Arab territories 
occupied by Israel should be the achievement of independent statehood. How will the 
right to external self-determination be exercised? The Declaration states that the 
‘permanent status’ of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be the subject of 
negotiations between Israel and the ‘Palestinian people representatives’ (Article I and
V.2), and that these negotiations must start ‘not later than the beginning of the third year 
of the [five year] interim period’ (Article V.2).
Everything is left to the agreement of the parties concerned. In particular, the 
Declaration does not spell out the possible final options: independent statehood free from
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any military or territorial occupation, e.g. right of passage for Israeli troops or nationals, 
Israeli jurisdiction over Israeli settlements, the maintenance of Israeli military bases, the 
obligation for the Palestinians not to militarize certain areas, free integration into another 
State; or free association with another State.^’
The vague character of these expressions gives a different interpretation. For instance, 
‘full autonomy for the inhabitants’ was interpreted by Israel to mean ‘personal 
autonomy’, whereas for Palestinians ‘territorial autonomy’ meant the autonomy of the 
West Bank, the Gaza District, and East Jerusalem. Similarly, the expression ‘self- 
governing authority’ was taken by Israel to denote an authority exercising powers and 
providing services ‘normally associated with the administration of the services and 
facilities of a particular group of people’. For Israel, the occupied territories were entitled 
to remain under the Israeli army and military administration in certain specific areas in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel contended that it would not divert itself of those 
powers, for its military administration would continue to be the source of authority for 
the self-governing bodies in the territories in question.^^
2.2.2 Security
The issue of security -internal and external— and its relationship to occupation 
was not clear. For the Palestinians, security would be assured by the phased dismantling 
of the occupation, the exchange of land for peace, and eventual implementation of 
national and human rights. For Israel, occupation was a nonissue while security was the 
most important issue, as maintained in Article VIII of the DOP: “...the council will 
establish a strong police, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for
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defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of 
Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.”
The external dimension of security would enable Israel to proceed in the manner 
of a de facto sovereign, responsible for all points of exit and entry. The internal 
dimension, meanwhile, would shift daily policing from the Israeli army to the Palestinian 
Authority’s (PA) police. This was very well explained by the ex-Prime Minister Rabin: “I 
prefer the Palestinians to cope with the problem of enforcing order in the Gaza Strip. The 
Palestinians will be better at it than we were because they will allow no appeals to the 
supreme court -  They will rule there by their own methods, freeing -and this is most 
important—Israeli army soldiers from having to do what they will do.”^^  Consequences 
of this dimension were severe, because it turned to confrontation between Palestinians 
and the PA, as will be illustrated in the following chapter.
2.2.3 Crucial Issues in Oslo I:
The Declaration leaves open uneasy questions. Crucial factors made the Oslo 
accords vulnerable to disagreements, causing new stalemates and creating new 
agreements. Another crucial issue was in Israel’s recognition, in the preamble to the 
declaration, of “mutual legitimate, and political right,” but not the national rights of the 
Palestinians or their rights of return enshrined in UN resolutions. The agreement was, in 
effect, predicated on the assumption that the Palestinians were the party that had done 
wrong and must apologize for resistance to a military occupation, effectively construed as 
acts of random violence. The “recognition” of the Palestinians by Israel actually 
acknowledged only the organization representing the Palestinians for negotiating the 
process, i.e., the PLO.
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Moreover, there was a clear absence of any reference to the exchange of land for 
peace. The Declaration implies that the West Bank and Gaza are “disputed” rather than 
occupied territory, thus implying that Israel has an equal right to lay claims to the land. 
This led to disagreements over the DOP’s meaning and implications.
Haidar Abd al-Shafi, head of the Palestinian delegation, argued that the notion of 
‘disputed’ rather than ‘occupied’ territory pervaded every aspect of the DOP. In his 
criticism, Haidar abd al-Shafi argued that, the DOP’s gravest flaw was that it failed ‘to 
address Israel’s illegal claim to the occupied territories’; if the territories were not 
‘occupied’, then they must be disputed -  the contention of every Israeli government since 
1967. Even where Palestinians were granted limited jurisdiction -  over the ‘five powers’, 
for instance -  this refers to ‘Palestinians in the territories’ but not the territories 
themselves. Abd al-Shafi said: “... we helped confer legitimacy on what Israel has 
established illegally.”^^  At the time of Oslo, these lands comprised 65 percent of the West 
Bank and 42 percent of Gaza. ‘Withdrawal’, in other words, meant redeployment. More 
critical was Edward Said who denounced the agreement as ‘an embarrassment’ that had 
reduced the PLO from a liberation movement to a ‘small town council’.*’' Among pro- 
Oslo Palestinians, Fatah’s leader Marwan Barghouti said: ‘Gaza-Jericho will not 
automatically lead to national independence, but the political space it opens up enables us 
to set off an irreversible dynamic [towards independence] through the new national 
mechanisms set in p l a c e . T h e  optimists believed that the return of the exiled PLO 
leadership and cadre could only strengthen and unify this new national struggle. 
However, Mohammed Abbas, the PLO excutive Committee member, acknowledged that
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Oslo ‘could lead to a Palestinian state or a catastrophic liquidation of the Palestinian
cause .63
Another crucial issue was withdrawal. In the declaration, withdrawal was referred 
to as from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank City of Jericho, but not from the West Bank, 
where only redeployment from population centers would take place. Moreover, 
withdrawal would not abolish the military government, because Israel did not 
acknowledge its status as an occupier (Article XIII and Annex II).
One more crucial issue was the source of authority that remained vested in the 
occupation regime. The Palestinian parliament was granted quasi -legislative power only 
over education, culture, health, social, welfare, direct taxation and tourism (DOP, Article
VI.2). This excluded the Israeli settlements and the network of roads comiecting these 
settlements with each other and with Israel proper, Jerusalem, and military locations. 
Moreover, the legislative power granted to the Palestinian parliament was made subject 
to a review process in which Israel has an effective veto. (DOP, Article VI. 1)
Not only these issues were crucial factors, but also together with other 
circumstances, consisted challenges to the achievement of true peace. These issues have 
contributed to the inevitable fragility of all of the succeeding agreements. The imbalance 
of power produced highly unbalanced agreements. This has led to opposition, which has 
been expressed in violence, including assassinations and suicide bombing.
2.5 From Oslo I to Oslo II
In the West Bank, and after the Hebron massacre '^*, Faisal Husseini and Bashir 
Barghouti called for ‘a reformulation of the DOP to include discussion of settlements
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now rather than after the interim period.’ For Husseini, Hebron had made this not an 
option but a necessity. ‘Israel has a choice’, he said. ‘It can have peace in the territories or 
it can have settlements in the territories. But it can no longer have both.’*’^
After several months of long and protracted discussions on implementing the 
DOP, Israel and the PLO reached a number of agreements on economic and financial 
issues as well as the early empowerment of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip 
and Jericho. An optimistic reading of the Paris Economic Protocol contains the notion of 
a Palestinians-Israeli partnership based on political cooperation and free trade. 
Transforming limited autonomy into economic sovereignty will take Palestinian 
resourcefulness and ingenuity and require generous and sustained support from the 
international community. Critics of the protocol argue that political dependency cannot 
but mask economic dependency, because the freer the Palestinian market, the greater will 
be Israel’s economic domination of it. This pessimistic reading of Paris rests less on its 
textual detail than on recent Israeli practice in three Palestinian economic sectors and on 
the essentially neo-colonial vision that drives it.*^ ^
Both the optimistic and pessimistic readings of the protocol acknowledge that in 
the short term, self-rule can only consolidate Israel’s hold over the territories’ economy. 
For optimists, such integration will develop and modernize the Palestinian economy 
laying the bases of economic sovereignty provided the PNA can set in place the right 
infrastructure conditions.^^ The pessimists argue that “given the grossly uneven 
relationships between the Israeli and Palestinian economies, the borders will be ‘open’ 
for Israel to penetrate Arab markets but ‘closed’ to the Palestinians to trade in any market
other than Israel’s.’>68
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In 1994, the two parties signed the Cairo agreement and the so-called Early 
Empowerment agreement, all of which had been prompted by deadlocks over border 
control (the security issue) and source of authority. After Rabin’s insistence that Article 
VIII of the DOP had given Israel responsibility for “defending against external threats, as 
well as... for overall security of Israelis,”^^  Rabin confirmed Israeli responsibility for 
overall security even in Jericho and Gaza in the interim phase in which Arafat had set up 
his Palestinian Authority.
In Cairo on May 4, 1994, the agreement spelled out the first details of Palestinian 
self-government, but a full program remained to be worked out over the next five years. 
The major points in the Cairo agreement called for complete Israeli withdrawal from the 
Gaza Strip and Jericho within three weeks (except from areas required for security of 
Jewish settlements). Israel would retain authority over settlements in these areas, keep a 
military base on the Egyptian border and control certain roads linking Jewish settlements 
with Israel. On the other hand, the PLO undertook that, within two months of the date of 
the inauguration of the council, the Palestinian National Council could convene and 
formally approve the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant (Article 
XXXI.9).
Israel applied the same security agreement in 1994 to establish a precedent 
regarding settlements. Sixteen Gaza settlements with 4,000 residents, occupying 18 
square kilometers were given an additional 22 square kilometers of land to provide them 
with a “security zone” and a measure of continuity.Israel used Article VII (5) of DOP 
to argue that settlements constituted an internal Israeli matter. Settlements were also a 
major stumbling block to extending the Gaza-Jericho agreement to the West Bank, as
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provided for in the DOP, because of Israel’s reluctance to jeopardize its numerous 
settlements there.
The result was a stalemate, which required a new version of the DOP, known as 
the interim agreement, or Oslo II, signed in September 1995. A major factor in that 
stalemate was Israel’s insistence that Articles V and VI of the DOP made a distinction 
between Gaza and Jericho, where there is a requirement to “withdraw” Israeli forces, and 
the West Bank, where there is a requirement only to “redeploy” from certain areas and 
not from the entire West Bank.
Details of the agreement were confirmed at Taba, Egypt, on September 18, 1995 
and Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin signed the agreement in Washington on September 
28, 1995. Oslo II was concluded and a document initialed. The final settlement is likely 
to be a more or less exact copy of the Interim Agreement [Oslo 1].
2.6 Principles of Oslo II
The Oslo agreement is defined under the two pillars that constitute it: elections, 
and the rule of law through the various individual freedoms and their protection by the 
police and courts.
Article X.l of the agreement made a necessary connection between the elections 
and Israeli withdrawals: “the first phase of the Israeli military forces redeployment will 
cover populated areas in the West Bank — cities, towns, villages and hamlets ... and will 
be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e., 22 days before the day of 
elections.”
This coimection between withdrawal and elections was not clear on what should
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happen first, although Article III.4, stipulates that “the PLO must call for election 
immediately following the signing of this agreement to take place at the earliest 
practicable date following the redeployment of Israeli forces.”
Depending on the nature, stability and results of an electoral process which was 
running well behind the maximum “nine months after the entry into force of the 
Declaration of Principle” (Article III.2), a decision would need to be made by America 
and Israel about whether a Palestinian State emerges, or whether Jordan will be the 
principal sovereign power. This was an issue whose result could not be predicted with 
accuracy. However, the general view was that if a Likud government ruled Israel, the 
answer could be the latter, and Jordan will recover, on paper, the territory it controlled 
before 1967. If Israel continued to be ruled either by a coalition government or by a 
Labor-dominated one, there could be a small Palestinian State.’’
2.7 Crucial elements in Oslo II
Negotiations to conclude a full peace agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinians were to have begun in May 1996 and completed by 1999. However, this 
phase of negotiations was to include the most difficult issues, such as the borders 
between Israel and the Palestinians, the political status of Palestine, the fate of Jewish 
settlers in the territories and Palestinian refugees. Many of the issues remained in dispute 
and until now has not been entirely solved such as: “security” arrangements in Hebron, 
the lack of a clear timetable for the redeployment of the Israeli Army, the land 
expropriations to accommodate the building of “by pass roads”, the limited scope of the 
authority, and the question of the release of political prisoners.
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Land: According to the agreement, Israeli forces were to be withdrawn from three 
regions in the West Bank. The first phase of Israel’s re-deployment was to leave 
Palestinians with territorial jurisdiction over 30 percent of the West Bank. Further 
deployments were promised in the future but their extent was not specified (Article 29). 
And within the areas coming under Palestinian territorial jurisdiction, Israel continued to 
claim undefined ‘legal rights’ (Article XXXI). Israeli leaders say that there could only be 
a redeployment of troops from Jericho and the Gaza Strip.
The Interim Agreement essentially creates three separate areas, which differ in 
terms of who rules them: Area A includes a number of cities that will be “fully” under 
Palestinian control. Area B -comprising some 640 villages and refugees camps, which 
will be under “joint” control. That is, Israel will have definitive control over security 
matters, while the Palestinians will have responsibility in the civil realm. Area C -  the 
Israeli settlements as well as all of the major traffic arteries in the West Bank, will remain 
under exclusive Israeli control. This category also includes “state land”, which comprises 
approximately half of the land in the West Bank. Israel refused to hand it over to the 
Palestinian Authority during the interim period, claiming that “this is an issue that 
touches on the permanent settlement, because it is connected to sovereignty over the 
territory.”’^
The interim agreement does not define the territorial authority of the Palestinian 
Authority. At the same time it does define the boundaries of the Palestinian collectivity 
for election purposes, and these boundaries include “liberated territories” [Area A], Area 
B and Jerusalem. In other words: “the West Bank and Gaza are defined ethnically but not
geopolitically.»,73
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Related to the “land” issue is the Israelis’ notion of autonomy, which was the very 
antithesis of the Palestinian position. For the Israelis, it was to mean only limited 
autonomy, covering persons and not territory, the outcome of the interim phase was 
intended to sanction the application to the Palestinians of a status reducing them from a 
nation to a mere minority, with no right to sovereignty over, or legal and historical tie to, 
their territory, which would then be deemed to be an integral part to Israel.’'*
Security: Israel retains ‘responsibility for external, as well as responsibility for overall 
security of Israelis (Article XII). In the name of security Israel is thus free to pursue any 
Palestinian anywhere (Annex, Article V).
The Clinton administration has effectively enunciated a new policy that considers 
Israel’s territorial needs and security requirements to be intertwined and their relationship 
determined by Israel. It has thus endowed Israel with the express power to redeploy in 
accordance with its security requirements as it “identifies” them itself during the interim 
phase.
The second major gain for Israel in the Hebron agreement (Oslo III) is what the 
United States refers to as “reciprocity”, a term introduced into the lexicon of Mideast 
diplomacy by Benjamin Netanyahu. Since he became Prime Minister, Netanyahu has 
accused Arafat of failing to live up to his commitments, thus justifying an agreement that 
he had opposed. The reciprocity obligation that is part of “Oslo III” places the onus on 
the Palestinian Authority, which must convince Israel that it is “capable and willing to 
comply with its security responsibilities” before Israel is “obliged to transfer additional 
areas of the West Bank to Palestinian jurisdiction.”’^
37
Rule of Law: Although the principle established in the DOP is repeated in Article XIX, 
requiring both Israel and the Palestinian Council to give “due regard to internationally- 
accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law,” (Article XII. 1) there 
is not much by the way of institutional arrangements to help put the principle into 
practice. In contrast, there is a repetition of the need for “a strong police force” (Article 
XIV. 1)
No one as yet knows how the so-called mixed jurisdiction will be administered, in 
that whether there will be one law for Israeli settlers, another for Palestinians. There is 
still a great deal of uncertainty as to what law the PLO will be administering.
Jewish Settlements: By 1998, the future of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories 
is still in doubt. At the time of Rabin and his successor Shimon Peres, they refrained from 
discussing plans to remove the settlers. Indeed, they continued projects started by the 
previous Likud government to enlarge and develop settlements in the greater Jerusalem 
region, extending well into the West Bank. The settlers formed a powerful political bloc 
with support from Likud and parties to its right and large Jewish constituencies in the 
diaspora.
Looking at the practice since Oslo, the general trend for settlements has not 
stopped, although there must be particular reluctance to allow new Jewish settlers to 
move too far within the territories. Even in the case of Jerusalem, where the process of 
Jewish colonial settlement had never been put in question, the political outcry resulting 
from state confiscation of a huge piece of land and redeployment of the Israeli 
government in May 1995 hides a qualitative change brought about by the peace. As a
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senior Israeli minister once put it: “we are not building bypass roads just to abandon them 
in two or three years.” *^^
Jerusalem: The text of Oslo II leaves Jerusalem’s fate for the permanent status 
negotiations (Article XXXI). However, to judge by the map appended to the accord, 
Jerusalem is already a closed issue. The official map of Oslo implicitly places Jerusalem 
within Israel. All major Israeli political parties were determined to maintain Jerusalem as 
their national capital, under Israel’s exclusive jurisdiction.
Rabin sent a direct shot across Arafat’s bow on the issue that it was non- 
negotiable: “We have come from Jerusalem, the ancient and eternal capital of the Jewish 
people.”’’ The statement is charged with political meaning, as Rabin was claiming Israeli 
control of Jerusalem -  forever. The Israeli plan in Jerusalem is well known and old, and 
there is, on the other hand, no official Palestinian plan for, or a consensus on Jerusalem. 
There is a chronic situation of neglect in the case of Jerusalem.
The rationale behind leaving discussion on Jerusalem until the last is that with all 
else resolved there would be too much at stake not to gain agreement over Jerusalem. 
Israel believes that there will be more to be lost by the Palestinians at this stage and 
therefore Israelis will have the advantage in pressing their case. Considering the 
contemporary Jewish settlements that limit the Palestinian land in cantons, this 
compromise will lead to annexation of Jerusalem and its Judification.
Refugees: The problem with the agreements (and Resolution 242) was ignoring those 
whom the process leaves out. This concerns the central historical problem in Palestine,
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which has resulted from repeated displacement of Palestinians and waves of refugees 
from 1948 onwards/®
The question of refugees, like Jerusalem, has remained a complex problem. 
Palestinian refugees are confronted with a series of challenges. Over half the 
dispossessed Palestinian population -  about 3.5 million people—does not reside in the 
West Bank or Gaza, and according to the peace process, has little hope of repatriation or 
compensation for what they have lost or suffered. Many are stateless refugees eking out a 
below-subsistence existence in camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, without the right to 
work or leave.
Obviously, the diaspora in the Arab world is significant. By order of importance 
this is composed of 300,000 to 400,000 Palestinians in Lebanon, a similar or slightly 
smaller number in Syria, then the significant population of Jordan, and, in orders of 
thousands, the remainder of the Gulf Palestinian migrants, and those in Egypt and North 
Africa.
Refugees’ civil and social rights including those of prisoners’ and martyrs’ 
families -  are neglected. The frustration and disappointment created thereby make 
refugees susceptible to the promises of resettlement, such as naturalization and camp 
rehabilitation programs.
Fifty years have passed without much change in the situation of the Palestinian 
refugees. Their hopes, dreams, and perspectives have been in tears over lost homes, and 
shelters of the refugee camps, despite the fact that the whole peace process is based on 
Resolution 242, to solve the issue of these refugees.
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Conclusion
The framework of the agreements between Israel and the PLO reflect ambiguity 
on arguable issues of territory, self-determination, security, settlement, Jerusalem and the 
refugees. As never before, the State of Israel operationally accepted the PLO and Arafat 
as diplomatic equals. Yet, textually there is no acknowledgment whatsoever of 
Palestinian sovereignty over the occupied territories, and no implication about the 
refugees or the issue of Jerusalem, despite Resolution 242 and the map appended to the 
accords. The drawbacks of these agreements are even more obvious when looking at the 
challenging experience of both Palestinians and Israelis after the signing of these 
agreements, which will be the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 3: The Post-Oslo Challenging Experience
Sitting at the negotiating table conveys the impression to the international 
community that there is an actual peace process going on, and so there is nothing to 
worry about. However, the unpleasant experience of several crises, like the deportation 
crisis of 1993, the land expropriation crisis of 1995, the turmel crisis 1996, and the 
settlement crisis of 1997, proved that the Oslo agreements’ failure was in signing limited, 
interim principles before finalizing the permanent Declaration of the Principles. Historic 
mistakes committed in the Oslo accords were not only the deferring of crucial issues, but 
also not containing a forceful mechanism to implement the principles signed.
Israel’s pursuance of confiscating Palestinian land, demolishing houses and 
expelling Palestinians from the whole region in Jerusalem, the policy of torture which is 
approved by the highest Judicial committee in Israel (the High Court of Justice), '^  ^and the 
response to peaceful Palestinian marches by retaliating with live ammunition, as well as 
preventing Palestinian's from entering Jerusalem and imposing a closure on the 
Palestinian towns and villages along with the policy of collective punishment, are but few 
actions indicating no sign of peace, or of a coming peace.
3.1 Violence and Suicide Bombing
On 25 February 1994, an Israeli settler, decided to unload his Galili rifle in 
Hebron’s al-Ibrahimi mosque, shooting dead 29 Palestinians at prayer. The magnitude of 
this act rocked both Israeli and Palestinian political establishments, but also became
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evident in Hebron’s bloody aftermath, at least to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 
that Oslo had not established peace, and rose doubts about the possibilities to achieve it.
In eight days following the massacre, 33 Palestinians were killed by the army as protests 
erupted in Gaza, Jerusalem, Nablus, Ramallah and, of course, Hebron. Over a million 
Palestinians were confined to the West Bank and Gaza as Rabin sealed off the territories, 
once more sending their perilous economies into freefall. Most provocative of all, Rabin 
curfewed for nearly six weeks Hebron’s 120,000 Palestinian residents -  the victims of the 
massacre, to ensure the safety of its 450 Jewish settlers. The Hebron massacre brought to
a head what many Palestinians viewed as the fatal flaw of the whole Oslo package: its
80defense on the issue of Israeli settlements.
As the tension escalated, on 6 April 1994, a West Bank Palestinian rammed a car 
full of explosives into a crowded bus station in the Israeli town of Afula, killing eight and 
wounding 40 others. In a statement claiming responsibility, Hamas said that ending the 
attacks was ‘conditional on Israeli settlers quickly leaving the West Bank and Gaza’.
On 14 August 1994, in two separate operations outside Gaza’s Gush Qatif 
settlement, Hamas guerillas killed one Israeli and injured five, causing a spilt between the 
Palestinian National Authority’s police and intelligence branches. The political leadership 
had to identify a clear-cut policy on how to deal with the armed opposition elements and 
use of weapons. The Israelis were livid. ‘The entire agreement with the PLO was 
predicated on the understanding that the PLO must combat terrorism and its perpetrators’ 
said Rabin. ‘If Yassir Arafat is unable to fulfil his part, why should Israel continue 
implementing agreements when there is no certainty that he could later comply with 
them?’*'
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The exchange of threats among Hamas and PLO, Israel and PLO, Hamas and 
Israel, was working against the agreements as well as the project of peace. The killing of 
Israelis inside sovereign Israel lit the fire beneath Rabin. Israeli domestic opinion thus 
usually demanded that Arafat did something to curb ‘fundamentalist terror’. However, 
‘Hamas’s terrorist activities contain two main political messages’. The first was to Arafat 
and the PLO as not to dare to ignore them; the second was to the state of Israel as to
negotiations with the PLO do not constitute the final word and that Hamas must also be
82taken into account.
However, bombing was not limited to the Islamists but also against them. On 2 
November 1994, an Islamic Jihad activist in Gaza, Hani Abed, opened his car door and 
triggered an enormous explosion. All Palestinian groups, including Fatah, were 
convinced his assassination bore the fingerprints of an Israeli hit job. A week later, in a 
bleakly predictable aftermath. Jihad member Hisham Hamad detonated himself outside 
Gaza’s Netzarim settlement killing three Israeli soldiers.^^ At a ‘crisis’ meeting in 
Madrid, Rabin reportedly told Arafat that any more incidents like Netzarim and the IDF 
would ‘fire indiscriminately’ on Palestinians in Gaza ‘regardless’ of the Palestinian 
police.*"^
Regarding these warnings, the PNA escalated its measures against Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad. However, they continued to carry out such operations of suicide bombing, as they 
believed in struggle until death.
On July 24, 1995, a Palestinian suicide bomber blew up a bus in which he was 
riding near Tel Aviv, killing passengers and injuring more than twenty. It was 
commonly thought that Hamas was responsible for the bombing. Rabin, Peres, and other
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government ministers repeatedly emphasized that they do not hold Arafat responsible for 
this action, since he has proven his desire and ability to suppress the Islamic opposition.
One of Hamas’ leaders in Gaza, declared in the wake of the bus bombing: “For 
the time being we in Hamas have not changed our policy regarding the carrying out of the 
attacks. Why should we change this policy? After all, the occupation still exists, the 
settlers have not been chased away, the prisoners have not been released, and Israel is 
still holding on to Jerusalem.”**’
However, not only the religious Isleimists opposed the process violently, but also 
the religious .lews. On 2 November 1995, a right-wing extremist Jew shot Rabin to death 
in protest of the agreement. On March 1996, Hamas suicide bombing killed 33 people in 
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The Palestinians suspended the talks and so did the Israelis, due 
to two other suicide bombings which took place in West Jerusalem.
3.2. Redeployment
According to the agreement, Israeli forces were to be withdrawn from three 
regions in the West Bank. The first phase of Israel’s re-deployment should leave 
Palestinians with territorial jurisdiction over 30 percent of the West Bank. Further 
deployments were promised in the future without specifying their extent. In three 
separate areas, created by the Interim Agreement, implementation of deployment of 
Israeli troops was not carried out as agreed. Shimon Perez stated: “It must have surprised 
the Palestinians by indicating that “Gaza first”, in Israeli view, need not necessarily mean 
a commitment now and implementation only after many months, or even years.”*^
In Area A, with about a third of the Palestinian population in the six largest
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towns, constituting between 3 and 5 percent of the area of the West Bank, full 
administrative authority was turned over to the Palestinian Authority. In Area B, 
including over 400 Palestinian villages and rural areas, about 25 percent of the West 
Bank’s area, the Palestinians assumed administrative and police authority. To pass from 
Area A to Area B, however, requires Israeli approval. Redeployment of Israeli forces 
from Area B occurred prior to the Palestinian Council elections in January 1996. Sparsely 
settled or uninhabited Area C, constituting over two thirds of the West Bank, includes 
Israeli settlements and military areas, and these were to remain under Israeli control until 
establishment of the council. Then Israel was to begin a phased further redeployment in 
six-month stages to be completed by the end of 1997. This process was suspended after 
Hamas bombings of February and March 1996.
It is worth recalling that Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Perez had used the spate 
of suicide bombings during the winter of 1996 to delay the three-stage redeployment that 
was to have taken place between March 1996 and September 1997 as required by Oslo II. 
In June 1996, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu came to office with reservations about 
the entire “peace process.’’ He declared intent to renegotiate the Oslo agreements in line 
with his campaign slogan—’’peace with security,” a euphemism for annexation.*^*
When pressed for a deadline for completion of the redeployment, Netanyahu 
offered the end of 1999. Jordan and the United States persuaded him to make it mid- 
1998, which would still give him an additional year over the agreed deadline. Thus, the 
only concessions that Netanyahu made were to scale down his expanding unilateral 
demands, and to make a partial redeployment from Hebron. In return, Arafat agreed to 
another list of concessions, some of which inflicted major damage to a position already
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battered by Oslo I and Oslo II. Redeployment from area A, in aecordance with Oslo II, 
was carried out in the winter of 1996, leaving Hebron intact. After one full year, during 
which Israel failed to redeploy any troops from Area A and B or from Hebron, and while 
Area C remained under total Israeli control, an agreement was finally reached in January 
1997 that is tantamount to an Oslo III. For Netanyahu, the Hebron agreement was a vast 
improvement over Oslo II.
Netanyahu’s triumph in the Hebron agreement was largely related to Arafat’s 
acquiescence to the American decision to cede to Israel the right to determine the extent 
of territory and number of forces that would be affected by the required redeployment in 
Area B during the interim phase, which means that Israel is no longer committed to 
withdraw troops from occupied Arab territories within the meaning of UN Resolution 
242. Herein lies the real difference between the two Israeli governments: Labor was 
willing to allow Arafat to take home something he could call a state -  although the fact 
that the settlements and Area C (70 percent of the West Bank) would firmly negate 
statehood, was to be overlooked. In contrast, the government of Benjamin Netanyahu 
seems unwilling to accommodate even the necessary diplomatic ambiguities in order to 
give Arafat some trappings to take home.
At present, Netanyahu’s best offer to Arafat is a redeployment from between 6 
and 8 percent of the West Bank on the condition that Arafat agree to move directly to 
negotiations on a final settlement. This would fall short of what the American 
administration considers a “significant and credible” redeployment, and would also 
enable Netanyahu to escape the obligation to make three further redeployments before the 
final settlement. For its part, the Palestinian Authority has been insisting that each further
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redeployment constitute about 30 percent of the remaining land in the West Bank under 
Israel’s control. All this does not augur well for the prospects of a satisfactory settlement, 
and could increase the likelihood of another collapse and thus another context for yet a 
new agreement with more pressure for additional Palestinian concessions and more 
conflict over interpretations.
3.3. Palestinian Authority (PA)
The agreement’s main principle was to establish an interim self-government 
authority in the form of an elected council in the West Bank and Gaza. Under the plan, a 
democratic Council would govern Palestinian affairs and provide for internal security, 
while the Palestinian police would ensure public order.
However, after the foundations for self-government were put in place, the 
widespread hopes for democracy in Palestine have not been realized. Indeed, the 
governing Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza strip is characterized by 
personalized, authoritarian politics. Evidence is abundant. Both local and international 
human rights groups have rebuked the authority for abuses committed by plenty of 
autonomous security and police forces.
The Palestinian Authority have adopted a number of techniques learned originally 
from their Israeli occupiers, including arresting individuals without charge and detaining 
them without trial under the guise of “administrative detention.’’ More significant in the 
long term than the common violations of human rights are the maimer in which the PA 
has attacked institutional life in the West Bank and Gaza, and the way in which power 
and politics have become personalized. The anti-institutional nature of the PA can be
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seen in its behavior toward both governmental and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).
Another common explanation for PA authoritarianism is based on the 
containment of Hamas, the fundamentalist Islamic group. Because, it is argued, that 
Hamas extremists will resort to any method, including terrorism, to undermine peace with 
Israel, the PA has to be ruthless in crushing Hamas— including employing undemocratic 
measures— in order to maintain peace. This argument not only avoids discussions as to 
why Hamas (and others) oppose the Oslo process, but also misses the point of the real 
reasons for PA’s authoritarianism. The Palestinian Authority sometime feels obliged to 
take certain actions against Palestinian rights. They sometimes violate and punish people 
because of their political affiliation. In the West Bank and Gaza, one can observe 
arbitrary humiliations, curfews and so forth typical of Israeli rule curtailed, yet with 
Arafat’s rule, in which citizens’ rights especially in the realm of civil freedoms are 
absent. It is a real disappointment that leaders have been arrested, detained, or pointedly 
questioned by security and police forces and about the activities of their NGOs and their 
personal politics.
Above all Arafat was held responsible to Israel for order in Gaza (a headache for 
Israel) thus turning him in the eyes of his people into Israel’s man.^  ^The pressure on the 
Palestinian authority to act as a proctor of Israel’s security contradicts the aim of 
negotiations and a true peace process. It is tragic that today Palestinian Authority is 
holding its own people under administrative detention, cracking down on dissent, 
arresting people for what they believe and for groups they belong to, rather for allegedly 
having committed specific acts. This is precisely what the international community has
49
held Israel accountable for during the past 27 years, and today the Palestinian leadership 
is asked to do the same thing. Such pressure removes violence and opposition—terror- 
forward.
Between their foundation in April 1995 and the end of 1997, “the courts tried and 
sentenced 46 Palestinians for direct and indirect involvement in anti-Israel terror acts.’’^*^ 
The months after Oslo saw an increase in fighting over national institutions and the 
scarce resources they marshalled. Palestinian police rounded up 350 Hamas ‘suspects’ 
without charge or reference to any due process of law. They ‘severely interrogated’ 
Palestinian journalists. The International Human Rights organizations and the Palestinian 
community protested against the PNA in carrying out illegal and political arrests among 
the Palestinian opposition forces,^* as the limited self-rule produced 40,000 policeman 
and bureaucrats, and not even a small scale state structure.^^
When it comes to health, sanitation, education, tourism, and the like, the National 
Authority is going to have limited scope to run matters to the best of its abilities. The 
consequences of this were evident. Because of twenty-seven years of brutal military 
occupation there are no Palestinian institutions really ready for even limited self-rule. The 
press has been full of details suggesting incompetence, the absence of funds, as well as 
the Palestinian police force’s inabilitj' to uphold order, and a general air of half-hearted 
festivity combined with almost total anarchy.
Added to these, corruption has been the rule of economic monopolies over the 
importation of basic key commodities. The right to trade invariably has been given to 
companies owned by families of important PA officials. Selective PA officials have made 
their economic fortunes in the past few years as a direct result of their political standing.* “^*
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3.4. Land Confiscation/ House Demolition
One might assume that with the signing of the Declaration of Principles, Israel 
Would cease any construction of settlement housing, since the Declaration contemplated 
negotiations about the settlements at the time of the determination of the final status 
between the two parties. However, even after the signing, Israel continued to build 
housing in the settlements.^^ Most Jewish settlements in the occupied territories are built 
on lands taken for security purposes or declared state lands by Israel. By 1993, and the 
signing of the Oslo accords, two-thirds of the West Bank and half the Gaza Strip had 
been confiscated from or otherwise made off limits to Palestinians.^*^
Land confiscation began under the labor Party rule immediately following the 
1967 war. Land confiscation accelerated dramatically when the conservative Likud Party 
came to power in 1977. Confiscation took many forms, from direct and “legal” 
expropriation to the use of land for “security” reasons. The process of land expropriation 
has continued wholesale, amounting now to more than seventy percent of the West 
Bank. ’^
Since 1988, Israel demolished more than 2000 Palestinian houses either for 
security reasons or for failing to have a permit, issued by the Israeli government primarily 
for Israeli citizens. The burden of the proof was not on the state to show that these were 
indeed state lands but on Palestinians to prove private ownership.
During the first six months of 1997, Human Rights organizations issued more 
than 40 petitions to halt demolishing Palestinian houses in the West Bank. But there are 
hundreds of houses still liable to be demolished. Since the Oslo Accords in Washington 
in September 1993, more than 513 Palestinian houses have been demolished and the
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Israeli policy of collective house demolition is still continuing.^* Israel had confiscated 
over 80,000 dunums^^ of Palestinian land, most of it in the Jerusalem area—which was 
ruled off-limits by Israel.'®*^
However, the International Human Rights organizations voiced their objection to 
the pressure campaigns carried out against the Palestinian people and its National 
Authority. They demanded the International community and especially the US 
government to compel the Israeli government to stop all imposed punishments. Israel 
argued that the settlers themselves established the settlements on their own, and that the 
Geneva Convention prohibited settlements only to the extent that settlement displaced 
local residents.'* '^ However, those arguments are weak because the government provided 
the land and funding for the settlements. Moreover, the Geneva Convention did not 
prohibit the settlement only where incoming settlers displaced local residents but
prohibited it under any circumstances. 102
3.5 Political prisoners
There is support internationally and locally for the immediate release of the 
Palestinian administrative detainees, and also Article XVI and Article 2 (C.) of annex 7 
of Oslo II stipulate the release of the detainees. Yet, 4,000 Palestinian political prisoners 
still languish in Israeli jails, 280 of them are being held without charges or trial under
administrative detention order. 103
It is worth recalling that before Nelson Mandela agreed to sign an agreement with 
the white South African government, he demanded that all the political prisoners be 
released. As a former prisoner, he knew very well that no peace agreement could be
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legitimate and sustainable without freeing those who struggled with him to obtain 
freedom. The release of the administrative detainees is not a legal issue but rather a 
political one. In contrast to expanding settlements or demolishing houses, a prisoner 
release would be an immediate message to the Palestinians of seriousness to “talk peace.”
3.6. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
Between February and May 1993,
the IDF killed 67 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip alone, including 29 in May, 
making it the bloodiest month of the uprising. A staggering 1,522 were wounded, 
98 per cent of them from live ammunition. Ten ‘search operations’ left 450 people 
homeless or, as one Gazan put it, ‘refugees from refugee camps.’ Property 
damage amounted to about $50 million. Palestinians were beaten, their homes 
raided, their communities curfewed. Most human rights searchers simply gave up 
counting. By the time of Oslo, there were 17,000 Palestinians in Israeli jails; most 
of them rounded up in the preceding nine months.’®'*
The report from Human Rights Organization shows that in its first few months the 
Labor government took more lives (especially the lives of children) than any previous 
Likud government.’®^ On 26 September 1993, the IDF launched an operation in Gaza, 
which left 17 houses destroyed, 16 arrested and the summary execution of two Hamas 
activists. Asked whether such actions were in the spirit of Oslo, IDF Chief of Staff, Ehud 
Barak, countered that ‘the more terrorists are arrested before the IDF pull out, the easier 
should be the task of the new Gaza [i.e., Palestinian] police’.’®® This is supported by 
James Baker’s remarkable speech, whose main point seemed to be that the top Palestinian 
priority today was not independence, statehood, or human rights, but Israeli security. “If 
autonomy doesn’t improve security for Israel”, he said, “there will be no Palestinian
autonomy”.107
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3.7. Economic Blockade/ and Gaza’s Economy
Israel’s strategic aim has been to achieve a higher degree of economic integration 
with the Arab world to gain greater access to Arab markets, and to breach the 46-year-old 
Arab economic boycott of Israel. For Israel’s capital, breaking the boycott affords the 
greatest prize of peace with the Palestinians, particularly if it argues the elimination of the
boycott in which foreign firms with major trade relations with Arab countries are
108penalized for trading with Israel.
On the other hand. The Palestinian economy suffered during the interim period 
more than it did during the past 27 years. By the fifth anniversary of the Oslo signing of 
the agreements, the Palestinian economy had been significantly damaged. The economic 
challenge after the peace process is formidable. This meant increased poverty, high 
unemployment (and permanent unemployment for a widening part of the labor force), 
rising levels of child labor, constrained trade relations, a further distortion of market 
forces, and an increasing need for relief and social assistance. The expropriation of land 
and water, the integration of Palestinian labor into the lowest degree of the Israeli 
workforce, the restructuring of Palestinian trade toward Israel, fostered extreme economic 
dependency on Israel, especially with regard to labor and trade. By 1987, for example, 
more than 70 percent of Gaza’s labor force was working inside Israel and 90 percent of 
its trade was confined to I s r a e l . F o r  Israel, the plentiful supply of cheap labor, as 
employing Palestinians (primarily in the agrarian cultural and construction sectors), 
helped the economic boom. For Palestinians, even the discriminatory wage rates provided 
an income well above what could be made at home.
Initial expectations of economic prosperity emerged from the 1993 Declaration of
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Principles (Oslo I) and the Economic Protocol, or the Paris Agreement. These two 
documents, along with the 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II), defined a legal framework 
for Palestinian economic activity, especially economic relations with Israel. Despite the 
removal of certain restrictions imposed during the military occupation, the majority of 
restrictions remains in force during the interim period and cannot be modified or replaced 
by the governing Palestinian Authority.
It should be noted that from 1996 to 1997, approximately 75 percent of all new 
Jobs derived from employment in Israel and with the Palestinian Authority, only 25 
percent of jobs were created in the private sector, which also has experienced the highest 
level of job destruction. The total closures of February-March 1996 and August- 
September 1997, however, undermined whatever economic recovery had taken place. 
The Israeli government officially justifies closure as a security measure.
Unlike in the past, however, closure has virtually cut off the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip from each other and has separated their two populations. As a result, the West 
bank-Gaza trade has diminished and the performance of Palestinian agriculture and 
manufacturing has weakened. Palestinian households have clearly felt the cumulative 
effects of economic depression, rising unemployment, and closure, illustrated by a 
decline in wage rates and lower average consumption level.
The foundations for a viable, self-sustaining Palestinian economy have failed to 
emerge in the wake of the Oslo peace accords. Economic conditions in the Gaza Strip and 
West Bank have deteriorated markedly, leaving the Palestinian economy weaker now 
than it was during the intifada of 1988-1993, when confrontations between Palestinians 
and the Israeli army were daily occurrences. It is poverty, not prosperity that increasingly
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characterizes the local economic landscape. In early 1996, at least 14 percent of the 
population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip lived at or below a poverty level of between 
$500 and $650 per person per year. The Palestinians have responded to economic distress 
in several ways, one of which is an increase in child labor.
In addition, Israeli closure policy, which was first imposed in March 1993 in 
response to attacks by Palestinians on Israelis in Israel itself, is the single most harmful 
external factor affecting the Palestinian economy. The PA has directly contributed to 
economic pressures through the creation of monopolies. The authority has established at 
least 13 monopolies in the Gaza Strip, controlling the import of such commodities as 
flour, sugar, oil, frozen meats, cigarettes, concrete, steel, tobacco, and petroleum. These 
monopolies are under the control of several individuals in Arafat’s iimer circle." ’
Bitter Truths about Gaza: Everything about the Gazan Economy is dependent on Israel, 
which while integrating Gaza economically separated it physically from Israel. Passage 
from Gaza and Jericho, sixty miles away from each other, was supposed to have been 
guaranteed for Palestine; until now it has not been realized, thereby violating the 
principle granted by the Israelis that the West Bank and Gaza are one territorial and 
economic unit.
Unemployment is worse now. Israel does not want Gaza because of its population 
and unemployment problems. It does not show any attempt to balance Gaza and the West 
Bank. “Unemployment in Gaza is rising to 60%, the streets are only slightly less filthy 
than before, hope (like food) is in short supply, and Israel can open or shut the borders as
it w is h e s . ’
112
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Where Palestinians trade between themselves or set up small subcontracting 
outfits whose business is exclusively geared to Israeli firms, Israeli contractors export 
raw materials for assembly by Gazan subcontractors, who then re-export the products 
across the Green Line for retail in Israel. Due to Israel’s closure and labor substitution 
policies, and massive structural unemployment, Palestinian labor in Gaza was not only 
cheaper than Israeli labor in Israel, it was also cheaper than Palestinian labor in Israel.
3.8. Freedom of Movement
I'he daily experience at the checkpoint be it open or closed, is a circumstance ripe 
for violence. It is the same as before —before Oslo— young men with guns barking orders 
at older men holding cards before their faces, seeking entrance, some are pulled aside for 
questioning and rough treatment, others secure access. The daily humiliation of the 
checkpoint is ripe for creating violence and antagonism. In Oslo, this issue was not 
addressed.
The importance for a Gazan being able to enter Israel to receive proper health 
care, to get a visa to live or study abroad, to work and earn bread for one’s family, are 
equally important for Palestinians to be able to freely travel from Gaza and the West 
Bank and the other way around, in order to move agricultural and other products as well 
as the freedom to enter Jerusalem. Yet, the issue was not settled in the Oslo Agreement.
Despite the necessity of this freedom of movement, Palestinians are dependent 
upon decisions handed down by the Israeli authority after they are subjected to a long and 
tyring bureaucratic process, which usually ends up in refusal. Israel controls the ability of 
Palestinians to enter and exit the areas under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority.
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The PA has the power only to deny entry, but not to grant official permission.
According to the Oslo Agreement, the police do not have the right nor the 
authority to do this without a special permit from Israel. Moreover, not only are ordinary 
Palestinians prevented from moving freely, even the Palestinian police are denied the 
right to freedom of movement and thus are incapable of effectively carrying out their 
duties of ensuring public security and order for their people.
3.9 Settlements/Har Нота
In a symposium on the Arab-Israeli Peace, the Arab-American leader James 
Zogby, stated that:
Settlements is not a building issue. It is a statement of the fact that these buildings 
will circumscribe Palestinian national rights. Go into the Palestinian villages and 
understand how many have lost land to the settlements, how many have lost the 
ability to farm. The West Bank land today is being physically raped. Hills of olive 
trees are being bulldozed. It happened during Labor and it is happening now.” ^
Linder the Geneva Civilian Convention, settlements of an occupying power’s own 
citizens may not be located in occupied territory. Thus, the convention appears to be 
violated by the Declaration of Principles and the interim instruments, which contemplated 
the continuing existence of the settlements.
Diplomatic trouble emerged almost immediately after the Hebron agreement, 
demonstrating once again the new agreements do not necessarily repair the situation and 
might create additional problems. The first was Israel’s announcement in March 1997 
that it planned to construct a new settlement on the site of Jabal-Abu Ghunaym (known 
as Har Нота in Israel), south of East Jerusalem.
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By agreeing to defer the question of settlements and Jerusalem until the 
permanent status talks, and by trusting to Rabin’s purely verbal pledge to maintain 
Israel’s ‘freeze’ on new settlement starts in the territories, the PLO leadership has helped 
to conceal, domestically and internationally, an actual Israeli expansion of settlements in 
the West Bank that it is now proceeding with, according to Israeli commentators, at three 
times the pace of settlement construction under the Shamir government.
Since Oslo, Israel has confiscated a further 40,000 acres of Palestinian land, 
targeting in particular ‘Greater Jerusalem’ and the existing settlements along the old 
Green Line, in effect preemptively redrawing Israel’s pre-1967 borders eastwards. It has 
also embarked on the building of a 400-km network of ‘settler roads’ in the West Bank 
and Gaza that will, for security purposes, be off-limits to Palestinians.'
Shamir’s Likud Party, which came to power in 1977, considered the West Bank to 
belong to Israel, on the ground that it formed part of the ancient Hebrew kingdom in 
Palestine. The Likud party asserted a right for Israel to establish settlements anywhere in 
the West Bank."^ The decision by Benyamin Netanyahu to build at Jabal abu Ghunim 
(Har Нота) brings Israelis and Palestinians .critically close to a point of no return. 
Coming after the lifting of restraints on settlement and building activities in the West 
Bank, Har Home finally exposes the harsh realities behind ‘negotiations’ with the 
Palestinians, even to those who stubbornly clung to the hope that they would lead 
somewhere but the present dead-end. Har Нота was a Labor Government project.”  ^Har 
Нота is only one of several settlement projects being pushed ahead in the ‘greater 
Jerusalem’ area. Others include the Ras Amoud area of Jerusalem, where an American 
millionaire is financing the construction of 132 units for Jewish settlers.'117
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Наг Н ота will choke off the last corridor of land connecting the Palestinians of 
East Jerusalem with their natural hinterland of the West Bank. All Palestinians fully 
understand the symbolism of this decision, and which, according to Netanyahu, there no 
longer is an East Jerusalem."® With the breaking of ground a new settlement at Jabal abu 
Ghneim (Har Нота) Netanyahu has thrown the peace process away, and he is sending a 
message to the world that Israel will do what it pleases in Jerusalem. However, as 
annexation of the occupied territories is not permitted by international law, and as East 
Jemsalem is an occupied territory, Israel’s measure to extend its legislation there and to 
incorporate east Jerusalem into Israel’s political system remains invalid.
Conclusion
The challenging experience throughout the peace process reflected the fact that 
before and after Oslo, the conflict remained, and by implication, Oslo would not change 
it with its limited, interim principles.
The conventional wisdom that Netanyahu has derailed Rabin’s peace train is 
contradicted by the current realities of Israeli politics: irrespective of party label, Israel 
excludes Palestinian sovereignty, removing settlements, negotiating Jerusalem’s status, 
releasing political prisoners, freedom of movement of Palestinians within the self-rule 
areas, and dismantling the occupation, thereby upholding the status quo. Netanyahu’s 
policies, therefore, do not repudiate his predecessors’ “peace,” but only the process. 
Whereas Rabin and Perez succeeded in enlisting the meaningful participation of their 
adversaries in the new governance structure, Netanyahu has been less sensitive to 
Arafat’s lust for the trappings of statehood and proudly declared non-negotiability of
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virtually all the final status issues.
However, the severe damage caused by the Oslo accords recalls for the 
mobilization of international attention and the enhancement of the UN resolutions on the 
conflict to proceed towards a genuine peace.
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Chapter 4: Hopes for genuine peace
After more than 50 years of the conflict, tension in the region currently continues, 
despite the signing of the “Peace Agreements” between the Israelis and Palestinians. That 
is due to the elements introduced in the Declaration of Principles, whose aim was not to 
put forward expressions of sovereignty and the modalities for the shift from occupation to 
self-mle and political independence, but only to create the right conditions for 
negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories. In addition, the implementation 
of the Israeli-PLO 1993 DOP has been a slow and tortuous process, characterized by 
repeated failures. As Yitzhak Rabin mentioned, “the agreements are filled with holes.”"^
From many Palestinian perspectives, the agreements and their implementation had 
never been satisfactory, and had always been flawed by the Israeli insistence on solving 
their security problems (including extensive mechanisms of protection for the 
settlements) at the expense of basic Palestinian rights.'^® On a textual level, the 
Palestinians arguably have actually lost ground in their basic quest for self-determination 
and statehood, and their case has been disfigured and converted into an administrative 
case in Oslo and Cairo. The agreements did not represent a principled commitment to 
peace but allowed Israel to consolidate its position in the occupied territories,'"' 
reflecting the disparities that the arrangements were one-sided in Israel’s f a v o r . T h e y  
contain a number of provisions that arguably protect the rights of the occupied 
Palestinian population. One such area is the military orders that Israel put into force in the 
Gaza Strip and West Bank during the occupation. Another is the issue that the parties
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agreed in the Declaration to defer to later negotiations, in particular, the status of 
Jerusalem, Israel’s settlements in the Gaza Strip and West Bank and the refugees.
Neither the Declaration of Principles nor the interim instruments referred to the 
applicability of the international law of belligerent occupation to the territories of the 
West Bank, including East Jerusalem, which the Israeli armed forces invaded and 
occupied in June 1967. The United Nations, other governments and many legal scholars 
have concluded that the Fourth Geneva Convention, supplemented by the other rules on 
belligerent occupation, is indeed applicable to the territories occupied by Israel. 
Pursuant to Article II of the Cairo Agreement (agreement on Gaza Strip and Jericho 
area), Israeli military forces have partially withdrawn from the Gaza Strip and from 
Jericho. Israel retains at least potential control over parts of the territory of the Gaza strip 
and Jericho area. The 1994 Cairo Agreement (Article 5) contemplated the continued 
functioning of Israel’s military government stating that: “Israel shall exercise its authority 
through its military government, which for that end, shall continue to have the necessary 
legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibility, in accordance with 
international law.’’
The extent of territory to come under Palestinian jurisdiction by the time of the last 
Israeli troop redeployment is not defined in the Agreements. In this connection, recent 
Israeli statements call particular attention to the omission of the definite article “West 
Bank and Gaza territory” in every clause of the Oslo agreements dealing with further 
redeployments and transfer of jurisdiction. This is precisely the same omission “from 
territories occupied” as opposed to “from the territories occupied” that has so tormented 
UN Resolution 242.’^ '* It resulted in the actual physical fragmentation of the West Bank
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and Gaza through the sectioning off of zones and the de facto recognition of the presence 
of Israeli settlements.
Not only the text of the Declaration of Principles and of the Cairo Agreement but 
also political reality make it clear that the Autonomous Territories (the Gaza Strip and the 
Jericho area) lack essential elements of sovereignty. Absence of statehood precludes the 
Palestinian Authority from exercising powers, which are essential to any sovereign state. 
Palestinian residents of the Autonomous Territories do not enjoy such protection which 
only states are capable of extending to their own citizens. Although relations between 
residents of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and the Palestinian Authority are not covered 
by international humanitarian law, it can be argued that the general principles and 
customary rules of international human rights law are nevertheless binding on any
125authority, which exercises wide powers over individuals.
Despite the current levels of legal confusion and political manipulation, the right of 
self-determination does have a discemable core content. Although there may be an 
overwhelming consensus that a Palestinian right of self-determination under international 
law exists, there is a notable lack of agreement - or even discussion—of what the 
exercise of that right by the Palestinians should properly entail. It is perhaps not 
surprising that, in the overtly political world of any national liberation struggle, the right 
to self-determination and the right to establish an independent state are routinely invoked 
interchangeably. ’
Human rights law depicts self-determination as the right of a people to pursue its 
political, economic, social or cultural development. Yet clearly this cannot take place in a 
territorial vacuum. Underlying all contemporary claims to external self-determination
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127(without exception) is the existence of an attachment or claim to a particular territory.
It can accordingly be argued that in order to be meaningful, the right to exist territorially 
as a people must logically include the following complementary core elements. First, the 
right of a people not to be expelled from its land. Second, the right of a people to be free 
from other forms of demographic manipulation such as the imposition of an alien settler 
population. “Prima Facie the presence of more than one hundred and forty thousand 
Israeli settlers in the Palestinian occupied territories provides one of the most striking 
contemporary examples of the threat posed by a settler community to the realization of a 
people’s right to self-determination.”*^  ^ The position of the international community is 
that the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip are occupied territories. 
Israel is accordingly an occupying power subject to the rights and duties prescribed by 
the law of belligerent occupation. What did not convince the international community of 
the legitimacy and 'humanity' of apartheid in South Africa, will ring true for a genuine 
peace for the Palestinians as well. Therefore the transfer of Israeli civilians and the 
construction of Jewish settlements violate this law of belligerent occupation, and of the 
Palestinian right of self-determination.
Although the settlers constitute a mere 6% of the total population of the occupied 
territories, their presence has significantly altered the demographic balance in key areas. 
In addition, their presence has perpetuated the displacement of the Palestinian population. 
Second, the confiscation of land and the appropriation of water resources for Israeli 
settlements constitutes a flagrant violation of Palestinian rights over their natural 
resources. Since 1967, more than fifty percent of West Bank and Gaza has been 
confiscated for settlement or related purposes. Almost a quarter of the population of the
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West Bank had all or part of their lands confiseated. The figure includes tens of 
thousands of Palestinians who depended on agricultural lands for their livelihood. The 
discriminatory allocation of water resources has had an equally harmful effect on the 
agricultural economy of the territories. The territorial areas over which the Palestinian 
Council has jurisdiction during the interim period consist of Palestinian cantons together 
with a number of smaller blocks of Palestinian villages divided by areas of high-density 
Jewish settlement. This ‘canton-ization’ of a self-determination unit not only violates its 
right to territorial integrity but may also preclude the option of freely determined 
independent statehood; as such it undermines the most fundamental aspect of Palestinian 
self-determination.
On the other hand, given the prolonged nature of both the occupation and settlement 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it is likely that any demands for dismantling the 
settlements will be met with a counter claim based on the human rights of the Israeli 
settlers. A better approach is to formulate criteria for balancing the individual human 
rights of the settlers against the collective rights of indigenous p e o p l e . I n  particular, the 
continued presence of the settlers may serve to preclude the exercise of the right of return 
of Palestinians refugees, deportees and expellees. By contrast, the human rights 
consequences of transferring settlers back to Israel proper are not likely to make any 
Israeli settler (unlike many of the Palestinian refugees or expellees) becoming stateless.
However, the Hebron protocol -  and mainly the accompanying American 
protection of Israel- completed the erosion of 242 and the relevant international laws. 
Thus, it is no surprise, but rather a logical sequence, that Israel proceeded immediately 
after the protocol with expanding settlement on land it had expropriated during the 1970s
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in East Jerusalem.’^ ' In fact, by signing the agreements PLO representatives have largely 
given away the essence of the Palestinian position ‘on the basis of which Palestinian 
national rights had gained worldwide recognition during the past quarter of a century
When the Israeli government refused to carry out the redeployment from 30 % in 
the West Bank, the US government proposed 13.1 percent redeployment to unblock the 
jam in the Oslo process. The realization that the US was unable or unwilling to 
“pressure” Netanyahu pitched Arafat preparing the diplomatic ground a scenario that 
goes beyond the US proposal to what would happen if and when “negotiations” and the 
Oslo framework generally are exhausted as a means to resolve the Israeli-Palestine 
conflict. The deadline for this is commonly accepted as 4 May 1999, the date when 
Oslo’s five-year interim period expires and when Arafat has vowed to declare a 
Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza. In other words, the Palestinians will have to 
rest content with full autonomy over no more than 6.6 % of historical Palestine, nor 
controlling the land and water reserves, the demobilization of the settlers or the return of 
the refugees.
Netanyahu’s interest in delineating the final settlement before carrying out the 
redeployments led to flood of varied maps of the “comprehensive solution”.'^ "' According 
to Sharon’s map, about 65% of the West Bank will remain under Israeli sovereignty. He 
does not mind if a miniature-Palestinian state is established.'^^ “He is certain that the 
Palestinians will give up ‘quantity for quality.’ Therefore, he is proposing a smaller 
withdrawal than that recommended by Mordechai, the Defense Minister; however, his 
proposal would give the Palestinians more territorial contiguity.” '^  ^ According to 
Mordechai’s map, some of the settlements will not remain under Israeli sovereignty. The
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plan does not contemplate the evacuation of settlements, but rather envisions Israel 
retaining extra-territorial control over them and over access roads. They will thus 
constitute something like land islands within the Palestinian areas.
Therefore, a defined map is urgent to commence negotiations. Unless Israel halts 
settlements, and recognize openly and officially Palestinians’ right to self-determination 
and an independent state, no peaceful coexistence seems feasible. To call for a freeze on 
settlement is no longer enough.’ ’^ Without a clear recognition by Israel of Palestinians’ 
national rights, facts on the ground can not be negotiated. On the other hand, Palestinians 
must emphasize their commitment to the principle of peace, and avoid violence because it 
will be exploited by Israel to punish them further. Peace is achievable if Israel withdrew 
to its 1967 borders, disarmed all settlers as a preliminary to dismantling all settlements, 
released Palestinian prisoners and permitted elections to a ‘sovereign body’ that would 
represent all Palestinians and process the authority to ‘define Palestinian self 
determination’, including the legislative power to repeal or amend the OOP.
The very tasks that faced the Palestinians and their supporters before Oslo remain 
as compelling as ever: to get rid of the occupation; to get rid of the settlements, and to 
win sovereignty. Once these goals have been accomplished, then the Palestinians may go 
on to decide, from a position of power and international support, what kind of 
relationship they want with Israel. The present-day Palestinian political landscape 
embraces diverse opinions about how the Palestinian society should be governed, with 
differing political formulae advanced by nationalists, secular leftists, Islamists, and 
conservative politicians, some with continuing ties to Jordan. Since the beginning of the 
intifada and the end of the Gulf War, these political groups have been engaged in intense
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debate about the future of the Palestinian national movement. The historical alternative is 
a democratic secular Bi-national State for all the people who live in Palestine regardless 
of their color, race, sex, and religion. If the world is secular now, it should accept this 
solution, instead of supporting a theocratic state based upon mythological beliefs.
The type of utopia which will hopefully lead to peace in the future is to formulate, 
then, a bi-national state based on equalization with regard to the rights of the people 
living outside, and also dealing with the fundamental historical questions; refugees, land, 
and the like.'^ *^  Although the Israeli public opinion is not willing to accept the notion of a 
joint government under conditions of equality between Israelis and Palestinians, the price 
of full separation between the two nations is higher than the price of living together, even 
with all the difficulties.
Moreover, the refugee problem, which constitutes six million scattered in 
different parts of the world, stands at the center of the conflict. Those refugees have no 
recognized passports. Nearly two millions who went to Jordan were granted Jordanian 
passports, yet others who went to Syria, Lebanon or to Egypt got travel documents which 
caused for them many obstacles to freedom of movement, let alone identity. Certainly, 
the contemporary situation of Palestinians being undefined citizens can not last forever if 
the humanitarian and the international law should be applied. The Oslo accords removed 
the issue from a national, political, collective, and spiritual right for the Palestinian 
people to a kind of humanitarian aid, for family reunification to occur case-by-case at 
best. Diaspora Palestinians living in the Gulf or the West are no longer on UNRWA 
registers. They do not even exist in statistical terms, nor have any studies been 
commissioned by the talks to quantify them. Regardless of the fact that most of the
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Palestinians have passports or citizenship in other countries, the fact that they are called 
Palestinians and consider themselves as such is guaranteed/provided in several UN 
resolutions.
Implementation of UN resolutions will be a step towards a genuine peace. 
Resolution 181 had called for the end of the British mandate and all British presence by 
Augustl, 1948. Two independent States would be created; an “Arab State” and a “Jewish 
State”, joined by an economic union. The city of Jerusalem would be put under a separate 
international regime.
Regarding the status of Jerusalem -the center of the three monotheist religions— 
it should be maintained justly and equally. The fact that the city does not belong to them 
alone, but also to Christians and Muslims who have loyalty to and yearning to worship, 
can not be transgressed. What was potentially dangerous is Netanyahu’s decision to open 
an archaeological tunnel in the Old City of Jerusalem in 1996 that left 80 Palestinians and 
15 Israeli ki l led. Indeed,  UN resolution 181 was clear on deciding Jerusalem as an 
international city, but the Israeli State has been determined about it in its 1980 basic law 
that Jerusalem “complete and united,” is the capital of Israel, despite strong international 
opposition and against an unusual vivid resolution of the Security Council. Since then 
Israel is the only UN member state whose capital has not been recognized by the UN, and 
its members. Its solution is critical to a durable and lasting peace in the Middle East
between Israel and its Arab neighbors, including Palestine. 140
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Conclusion
The two documents, one signed in Washington on September 13, 1993, and the 
other in Cairo on May 4, 1994, created a fundamental change in the Palestinian political 
terrain and in the very nature of the struggle for a diplomatic settlement, which began 
more than twenty-five years ago. Oslo is something between a surrender agreement on 
the part of the Palestinians and one of the international exigencies and pressures imposed 
on the Palestinian leadership. The Oslo and Cairo accords have already shattered the 
Palestinian consensus that these negotiations must yield a genuine independence rather 
than a fractured entity composed of scattered enclaves and “autonomous zones” 
surrounded by blocs of Jewish settlements.
The crucial legal issue is that unless Israel comes to terms with its status as 
occupant, within the meaning of international law, it would render any agreement 
regarding withdrawal, security, sovereignty and human rights completely superfluous. 
Not only did Israel refuse to make such a commitment in the Oslo agreements, but the 
Palestinian leadership has also acquiesced in the refusal, thus giving credence to the 
claim that the West Bank and Gaza are disputed rather than occupied territory. Hence, 
Israel assumed an equal right to lay claims to Palestinian land occupied since 1967, while 
the status of Jerusalem, the still expanding colonial settlements, the land issue and 
refugees were deferred for several years.
It is evident that by signing Oslo I and II, turned what could have been called 
Palestine to a small, tyrannical canton, but never a unified democratic state. A resolution 
of the Palestinian question in accordance with international legitimacy is the 
establishment of an independent state in the West bank and the Gaza Strip (Security
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Council Resolution 181), and the return of the refugees or compensating those who prefer 
to stay where they are (Resolution 194). All this is supposed to be implemented after the 
complete withdrawal, not redeployment, of the Israeli forces from what it occupied in 
1967.
The notion of a bi-national state is a realistic one, precisely now although not in 
the sense that this concept had acquired in the 1940s. Because a full separation means a 
fragment and too small a Palestinian territory, the settlements and Jerusalem and other 
common interests that require intimate links between Israelis and Palestinians -  in regard 
to employment, the economy, division of resources, and ecology. Therefore, at this 
moment, struggling for a genuine process of peaceful coexistence between Palestinians 
and Israelis on one land is more relevant than struggling to see the Oslo Accords 
implemented in a better way.
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UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION NO. 194 OF 11 DECEMBER 1948
ESTABLISHING A U.N. CONCILIATION COMMISSION, RESLOVING JERUSALEM 
SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL REGIME, AND 
RESOLVING THAT THE REFUGEES SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO RETURN TO THEIR 
HOMES
The General Assembly,
Having considered  further the situation in Palestine,
1. Expresses its deep appreciation of progress achieved through the good offices of the late 
United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, 
for which cause he sacrificed his life; and
Extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion 
to duty in Palestine;
2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States Members of the United 
Nations which shall have the following functions:
(a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given 
to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly 
of 14 May 1948;
(b) To carry out the specific function and directives given to it by the present resolution and such 
additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the 
Security Council;
(c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to 
the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by 
resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the 
Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator 
on Palestine under Security Council Resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be 
terminated;
3. Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics; the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present, 
before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly, for the 
approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the Conciliation Commission; States which 
will constitute the Conciliation Commission;
4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of 
contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;
5. Calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of negotiations 
provided for in the Security Council’s resolution of 16 November 1948 and to seek 
agreement by negotiations conducted either with the conciliation Commission or directly, 
with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;
6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities 
concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;
7. Resolves that the Holy Places -including Nazareth—religious buildings and sites in Palestine 
should be protected and free access to them assured; in accordance with existing rights and 
historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nation 
supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presenting to the fourth 
regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for a permanent international 
regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations concerning the Holy 
Places in that territory; that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the 
Commission should call upon the political authorities of the area concerned to give
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appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and 
that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval;
8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, 
including the present municipality of Jerusalem/j/i/i the surrounding villages and towns, the 
most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western. Bin 
Kerim (including also built-up area ofMotsa); and the most northern Shu’fat, should be 
accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under 
effective United Nations control;
Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem 
at the earliest possible dates;
Instructs the Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly 
detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will 
provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special 
international status of the Jerusalem area;
The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative, who 
shall co-operate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the 
Jerusalem area;
9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among Governments and 
authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be 
accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine;
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for 
appropriate action by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;
10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the governments and 
authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including 
arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and 
communication facilities;
11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation 
should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for the loss and damage to 
property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by 
the Governments or authorities responsible;
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and 
economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to 
maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees 
and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ 
such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the effective 
discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolutions;
The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities 
responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible foe taking all measures 
necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General will provide a 
limited number of guards for the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;
13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the 
Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United 
Nations.
14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation 
Commission and to take all responsible steps to assist in the implementation of the present 
resolution;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make 
appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of 
the present resolution.
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SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON PRINCIPLES OF A JUST AND LASTING
PEACE IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 1967
ANNEX 2
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, 
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to 
work for a just lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security. 
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the charter of the 
United have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of the Charter principles requires the establishment of a 
just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both 
of the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories [des territories occupes] in 
the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of alt claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within 
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State 
in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the 
Middle East to establish and maintain contacts, with the States concerned in order to 
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in 
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the 
efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
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1973 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR CEASE-FIRE AND
IMPLEMENATION 
OF RESOLUTION 242
ANNEX 3
The Security Council
1. Calls upon all parties to the preset fighting to cease all firing and terminate all
military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption 
of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the 
implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start 
between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just 
and durable peace in the Middle East.
2.
3.
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Declaration Of Principles 
On Interim Self-Government Arrangements 
September 13, 1993
The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the 
Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, 
recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence 
and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement 
and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the, two sides agree 
to the following principles:
ANNEX 4
ARTICLE I: AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, 
among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected 
Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a 
transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and 
that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338.
ARTICLE II: FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD
The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles. 
ARTICLE III: ELECTIONS
1.
2.
3.
In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern 
themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections 
will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while 
the Palestinian police will ensure public order.
An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in 
accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections 
not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.
These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the 
realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.
ARTICLE IV 
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that 
will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim 
period.
ARTICLE V
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS
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1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho area.
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the 
beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and 
the Palestinian people representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: 
Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and 
cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be 
prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.
ARTICLE VI
PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the 
Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military 
government and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as 
detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature 
until the inauguration of the Council.
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal 
from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the 
following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and 
tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as 
agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the 
transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.
ARTICLE VII
INTERIM AGREEMENT
1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period 
(the "Interim Agreement")
2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, 
the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the 
Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim 
Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in 
accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the 
inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of thé powers and 
responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.
4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the 
Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza 
Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion 
Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a 
Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in 
accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and 
responsibilities.
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the 
Israeli military government will be withdrawn.
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PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry 
the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall 
security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.
ARTICLE IX
LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS
1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, 
within all authorities transferred to it.
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining 
spheres.
ARTICLE X
JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any 
subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this 
Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in 
order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.
ARTICLE XI
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS
Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, 
the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli- 
Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and 
implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached asAnnex III 
and Annex IV.
ARTICLE XII
LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT
The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing 
further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the 
Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the 
other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the 
constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of 
admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with 
necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be 
dealt with by this Committee.
ARTICLE XIII
REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES
1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of 
elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in 
accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military 
forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.
3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented 
commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security 
by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.
A R T IC L E  VIII
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ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as
AnnexIL
ARTICLE XV
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, 
or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by 
negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X 
above.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of 
conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, 
which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both 
parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.
ARTICLE XVI
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMS
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a
"Marshall Plan", the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV .
ARTICLE XVII
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.
2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining 
thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.
A R T IC L E  X IV
ANNEX I
PROTOCOL ON THE MODE AND CONDITIONS OF ELECTIONS
1.
2.
3.
Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election 
process, according to an agreement between the two sides.
In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following
issues:
a.
b.
the system of elections;
the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their 
personal composition; and
c. rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed 
arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a 
broadcasting and TV station.
The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not 
be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to 
practical reasons.
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PROTOCOL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND 
JERICHO AREA
1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force 
of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military 
forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive 
arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli 
withdrawal.
2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces 
from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the 
agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not 
exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.
3. The above agreement will include, among other things:
a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli 
military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian 
representatives.
b. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, 
except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other 
mutually agreed matters.
c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the 
Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from 
abroad holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). 
Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad 
should be trained as police and police officers.
d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.
e. Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation 
Committee for mutual security purposes.
f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the 
establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and 
financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly 
and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.
g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho area.
4. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties 
regarding passages:
a. Gaza - Egypt; and
b. Jericho - Jordan.
5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian 
authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be 
located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.
6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will 
continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed 
in the interim period.
ANNEX II
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PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
ANNEX III
2.
3.
4.
5.
The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing Committee for Economic 
Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following;
1. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by 
experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the 
management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include 
proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable 
utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period. 
Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, 
which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, 
purchase and sale of electricity resources.
Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which 
will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the 
Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy 
resources. This Program may also provide for the construction of a Petrochemical 
industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines. 
Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action 
Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank. 
Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, which 
will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for 
the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Program will provide for 
carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc. 
Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, 
which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study 
of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, 
and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.
Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which 
will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli- Palestinian Industrial Research and 
Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide 
guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, 
computer and science-based industries.
A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social 
welfare issues.
A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli- 
Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training 
centers, research institutes and data banks.
10. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in 
this sphere.
11. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication 
and media.
12. Any other programs of mutual interest.
6.
7.
8 .
9.
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PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
1. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting 
a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to 
be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this 
program of other interested states, such as members of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members 
of the private sector.
2. The Development Program will consist of two elements:
a. an Economic Development Program for the 'West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
b. a Regional Economic Development Program.
A. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza strip will 
consist of the following elements:
1. A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction 
Program.
2. A Small and Medium Business Development Plan.
3. An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, 
transportation and communications, etc.)
4. A Human Resources Plan.
5. Other programs.
B. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following 
elements:
1. The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, 
and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step.
2. The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for 
coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.
3. The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) - Dead Sea Canal.
4. Regional Desalinization and other water development projects.
5. A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated 
regional effort for the prevention of desertification.
6. Interconnection of electricity grids.
7. Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial 
exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.
8. A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications 
Development Plan.
9. Regional cooperation in other spheres.
3. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate 
towards their success. The two parties will encourage intersessional activities, as well as 
pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.
AGREED MINUTES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF- 
GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS
A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS
Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of 
Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles 
pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.
ANNEX IV
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2 .
3.
4.
B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS 
Article IV
It is understood that:
1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for 
issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations; Jerusalem, settlements, 
military locations, and Israelis.
2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, 
spheres and authorities transferred to it.
Article VI (2)
It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:
1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorised 
Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be 
transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following 
fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any 
other authorities agreed upon.
It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.
Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations 
in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also 
will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes 
collected by the direct taxation office.
Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian 
delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of 
authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.
Article VII (2)
The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.
Article VII (5)
The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and 
responsibilities not transferred to the Council.
Article VIII
It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and 
coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers 
and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed 
in the Interim Agreement.
Article X
It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and 
Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as 
members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee.
It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. 
The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other 
technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and 
place or places of its meetings.
Annex II
It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible 
for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli 
military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the 
Jericho area.
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The Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement On The West Bank & The Gaza Strip 
Washington, D.C. September 28, 1995
The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(hereinafter "the PLO"), the representative of the Palestinian people;
ANNEX 5
PREAMBLE
Wrn IIN the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in October 1991 ; 
REAFFIRMING their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation and to live in peaceful 
coexistence, mutual dignity and security, while recognizing their mutual legitimate and political rights; 
REAFFIRMING their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic 
reconciliation through the agreed political process;
RECOGNIZING that the peace process and the new era that it has created, as well as the new relationship 
established between the two Parties as described above, are irreversible, and the determination of the two 
Parties to maintain, sustain and continue the peace process;
RECOGNIZING that the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace 
process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, i.e. the 
elected Council (hereinafter "the Council" or "the Palestinian Council"), and the elected Ra'ees of the 
Executive Authority, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional 
period not exceeding five years from the date of signing the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and theJericho 
Area (hereinafter "the Gaza-Jericho Agreement") on May 4, 1994, leading to a permanent settlement 
based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
REAFFIRMING their understanding that the interim self-government arrangements contained in this 
Agreement are an integral part of the whole peace process, that the negotiations on the permanent status, 
that will start as soon as possible but not later than May 4, 1996, will lead to the implementation of 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and that the Interim Agreement shall settle all the issues of the 
interim period and that no such issues will be deferred to the agenda of the permanent status negotiations; 
REAFFIRMING their adherence to the mutual recognition and commitments expressed in the letters 
dated September 9, 1993, signed by and exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and the 
Chairman of the PLO;
DESIROUS of putting into effect the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements signed at Washington, DC on September 13, 1993, and the Agreed Minutes thereto 
(hereinafter "the DOP") and in particular Article III and Annex 1 concerning the holding of direct, free 
and general political elections for the Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority in order that the 
Palestinian people in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip may democratically elect accountable 
representatives;
RlvCOGNlZING that these elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the 
l ealization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their Just requirements and will provide a 
democratic basis for the establishment of Palestinian institutions;
REAFFIRMING their mutual commitment to act, in accordance with this Agreement, immediately, 
efllciently and effectively against acts or threats of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed 
by Palestinians or Israelis;
FOLLOWING the Gaza-Jericho Agreement; the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and 
Responsibilities signed at Erez on August 29, 1994 (hereinafter "the Preparatory Transfer Agreement"); 
and the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed at Cairo on August 27, 1995
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(hereinafter "the Further Transfer Protocol"); which three agreements will be superseded by this 
Agreement;
HEREBY AGREE as follows;
CHAPTER 1 - THE COUNCIL
ARTICLE I: Transfer of Authority
1. Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli 
military government and its Civil Administration to the Council in accordance with this 
Agreement. Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so transfer.
2. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the powers and responsibilities transferred to the 
Council shall be exercised by the Palestinian Authority established in accordance with the Gaza- 
Jericho Agreement, which shall also have all the rights, liabilities and obligations to be assumed 
by the Council in this regard. Accordingly, the term "Council" throughout this Agreement shall, 
pending the inauguration of the Council, be construed as meaning the Palestinian Authority.
3. The transfer of powers and responsibilities to the police force established by the Palestinian 
Council in accordance with Article XIV below (hereinafter "the Palestinian Police") shall be 
accomplished in a phased manner, as detailed in this Agreement and in the Protocol concerning 
Redeployment and Security Arrangements attached as Annex 1 to this Agreement (hereinafter 
"Annex 1").
4. As regards the transfer and assumption of authority in civil spheres, powers and responsibilities 
shall be transferred and assumed as set out in the Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs attached as 
Annex 111 to this Agreement (hereinafter "Annex III").
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration in the West Bank will be 
dissolved, and the Israeli military government shall be withdrawn. The withdrawal of the military 
government shall not prevent it from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to 
the Council.
6. A .loint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee (hereinafter "the CAC"), .loint 
Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees, one for the Gaza Strip and the other for the West Bank, 
and District Civil Liaison Offices in the West Bank shall be established in order to provide for 
coordination and cooperation in civil affairs between the Council and Israel, as detailed in Annex
III.
7. The offices of the Council, and the offices of its Ra'ees and its Executive Authority and other 
committees, shall be located in areas under Palestinian territorial jurisdiction in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip.
AR riCLE II: Elections
1. In order that the Palestinian people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may govern themselves 
according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the 
Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council in accordance with the 
provisions set out in the Protocol concerning Elections attached as Annex II to this Agreement 
(hereinafter "Annex H").
2. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towards the realization of the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requiiements and will provide a 
democratic basis for the establishment of Palestinian institutions.
3. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there may participate in the election process in accordance 
with the provisions contained in this Article and in Article VI of Annex 11 (Election 
Arrangements concerning Jerusalem).
4. The elections shall be called by the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority immediately following 
the signing of this Agreement to take place at the earliest practicable date following the
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redeployment of Israeli forces in accordance with Annex I, and consistent with the requirements 
of the election timetable as provided in Annex II, the Election Law and the Election Regulations, 
as defined in Article I of Annex II.
ARTICLE III: Structure of the Palestinian Council
1. The Palestinian Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council constitute the 
Pale.stinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which will be elected by the Palestinian people 
of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip for the transitional period agreed in Article I of 
the DOP.
2. The Council shall possess both legislative power and executive power, in accordance with 
Articles VII and IX of the DOP. The Council shall carry out and be responsible for all the 
legislative and executive powers and responsibilities transferred to it under this Agreement. The 
exercise of legislative powers shall be in accordance with Article XVIII of this Agreement 
(Legislative Powers of the Council).
3. The Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be directly and 
simultaneously elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, 
in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the Election Law and Regulations, 
which shall not be contrary to the provisions of this Agreement.
4. The Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be elected for a 
transitional period not exceeding five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on 
May 4, 1994.
5. Immediately upon its inauguration, the Council will elect from among its members a Speaker. 
The Speaker will preside over the meetings of the Council, administer the Council and its 
committees, decide on the agenda of each meeting, and lay before the Council proposals for 
voting and declare their results.
6. The jurisdiction of the Council shall be as determined in Article XVII of this Agreement 
(Jurisdiction).
7. The organization, structure and functioning of the Council shall be in accordance with this 
Agreement and the Basic Law for the Palestinian Interim Self- Government Authority, which 
Law shall be adopted by the Council. The Basic Law and any regulations made under it shall not 
be contrary to the provisions of this Agreement.
8. The Council shall be responsible under its executive powers for the offices, services and 
departments transferred to it and may establish, within its Jurisdiction, ministries and subordinate 
bodies, as necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities.
9. The Speaker will present for the Council's approval proposed internal procedures that will 
regulate, among other things, the decision-making processes of the Council.
ARTICLE IV; Size of the Council
4'hc Palestinian Council shall be composed of 82 representatives and the Ra'ees of the Executive
Authority, who will be directly and simultaneously elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank,
Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.
AR'flCLE V: The Executive Authority of the Council
1. The Council will have a committee that will exercise the executive authority of the Council, 
formed in accordance with paragraph 4 below (hereinafter "the Executive Authority").
2. The Executive Authority shall be bestowed with the executive authority of the Council and will 
exercise it on behalf of the Council. It shall determine its own internal procedures and decision 
making processes.
3. The Council will publish the names of the members of the Executive Authority immediately upon 
their initial appointment and subsequent to any changes.
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a. The Ra'ees of the Eixeciitive Authority shall be an ex officio member of the Executive 
Authority.
b. All of the other members of the Executive Authority, except as provided in subparagraph
c. below, shall be members of the Council, chosen and proposed to the Council by the 
Ra'ees of the Executive Authority and approved by the Council.
c. The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority shall have the right to appoint some persons, in 
number not exceeding twenty percent of the total membership of the Executive 
Authority, who are not members of the Council, to exercise executive authority and 
participate in government tasks. Such appointed members may not vote in meetings of 
the Council.
d. Non-elected members of the Executive Authority must have a valid address in an area 
under the jurisdiction of the Council.
AR'I’ICLE VI: Other Committees of the Council
1. The Council may form small committees to simplify the proceedings of the Council and to assist 
in controlling the activity of its Executive Authority.
2. Each committee shall establish its own decision-making processes within the general framework 
of the organization and structure of the Council.
ARTICLE VII; Open Government
1. All meetings of the Council and of its committees, other than the Executive Authority, shall be 
open to the public, except upon a resolution of the Council or the relevant committee on the 
grounds of security, or commercial or personal confidentiality.
2. Participation in the deliberations of the Council, its committees and the Executive Authority shall 
be limited to their respective members only. Experts may be invited to such meetings to address 
specific issues on an ad hoc basis.
ARIICLE VIII: .ludicial Review
Any person or organization affected by any act or decision of the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the 
Council or of any member of the Executive Authority, who believes that such act or decision exceeds the 
authority of the Ra'ees or of such member, or is otherwise incorrect in law or procedure, may apply to the 
relevant Palestinian Court of Justice for a review of such activity or decision.
AR riCLE IX: Powers and Responsibilities of the Council
1. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Council will, within its jurisdiction, have 
legislative powers as set out in Article XVIIl of this Agreement, as well as executive powers.
2. The executive power of the Palestinian Council shall extend to all matters within its jurisdiction 
under this Agreement or any future agreement that may be reached between the two Parties 
during the interim period. It shall include the power to formulate and conduct Palestinian policies 
and to supervise their implementation, to issue any rule or regulation under powers given in 
approved legislation and administrative decisions necessary for the realization of Palestinian self- 
government, the power to employ staff, sue and be sued and conclude contracts, and the power to 
keep and administer registers and records of the population, and issue certificatés, licenses and 
documents.
3. The Palestinian Council's executive decisions and acts shall be consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement.
4. The Palestinian Council may adopt all necessary measures in order to enforce the law and any of 
its decisions, and bring proceedings before the Palestinian courts and tribunals.
a. In accordance with the DOP, the Council will not have powers and responsibilities in the 
sphere of foreign relations, which sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, 
consulates or other types of foreign missions and posts or permitting their establishment
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5.
in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic and 
consular staff, and the exercise of diplomatic functions.
b. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, the PLO may conduct negotiations and 
sign agreements with states or international organizations for the benefit of the Council in 
the following cases only:
economic agreements, as specifically provided in Annex V of this Agreement; 
agreements with donor countries for the purpose of implementing arrangements 
for the provision of assistance to the Council ;
agreements for the purpose of implementing the regional development plans 
detailed in Annex IV of the DOP or in agreements entered into in the framework 
of the multilateral negotiations; and 
cultural, scientific and educational agreements.
c. Dealings between the Council and representatives of foreign states and international 
organizations, as well as the establishment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 
representative offices other than those described in subparagraph 5.a above, for the 
purpose of implementing the agreements referred to in subparagraph 5.b above, shall not 
be considered foreign relations.
Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Council shall, within its jurisdiction, have an 
independent Judicial system composed of independent Palestinian courts and tribunals.
CHAPTER 2 - REDEPLOYMENT AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
2.
3.
4.
ARTICLE X; Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces
1. The first phase of the Israeli military forces redeployment will cover populated areas in the West 
Bank - cities, towns, villages, refugee camps and hamlets - as set out in Annex I, and will be. 
completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e., 22 days before the day of the 
elections.
2. Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence 
after the inauguration of the Council and will be gradually implemented commensurate with the 
assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian Police, to be 
completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council as detailed in 
Articles XI (Land) and XIII (Security), below and in Annex 1.
3. The Palestinian Police shall be deployed and shall assume responsibility for public order and 
internal security for Palestinians in a phased manner in accordance with Article XIII (Security) 
below and Annex I.
4. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for external security, as well as the responsibility 
for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public 
order.
5. For the purpose of this Agreement, "Israeli military forces" includes Israel Police and other Israeli 
security forces.
ARTICLE XI: Land
1. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and 
status of which will be preserved during the interim period.
2. The two sides agree that West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be 
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will come under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian 
Council in a phased manner, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration 
of the Council, as specified below:
a. Land in populated areas (Areas A and B), including government and Al Waqf land, will 
come under the Jurisdiction of the Council during the first phase of redeployment.
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b. All civil powers and responsibilities, including planning and zoning, in Areas A and B, 
set out in Annex III, will be transferred to and assumed by the Council during the first 
phase of redeployment.
In Area C, during the first phase of redeployment Israel will transfer to the Council civil 
powers and responsibilities not relating to territory, as set out in Annex III.
The further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will be 
gradually implemented in accordance with the DOP in three phases, each to take place 
after an interval of six months, after the inauguration of the Council, to be completed 
within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.
During the further redeployment phases to be completed within 18 months from the date 
of the inauguration of the Council, powers and responsibilities relating to territory will be 
transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip 
territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. 
The specified military locations referred to in Article X, paragraph 2 above will be 
determined in the further redeployment phases, within the specified time-frame ending 
not later than 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, and will be 
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
For the purpose of this Agreement and until the completion of the first phase of the further 
redeployments: 
a.
c.
d.
e.
f
b.
c.
"Area A" means the populated areas delineated by a red line and shaded in brown on 
attached map No. I;
"Area B" means the populated areas delineated by a red line and shaded in yellow on 
attached map No. 1, and the built-up area of the hamlets listed in Appendix 6 to Annex 1; 
and
"Area C" means areas of the West Bank outside Areas A and B, which, except for the 
issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually 
transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in accordance with this Agreement.
AR riCLE XII: Arrangements for Security and Public Order
I. In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, the Council shall establish a strong police force as set out in Article XIV below. 
Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for defense against external threats, including the 
responsibility for protecting the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, and for defense against external 
threats from the sea and from the air, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis 
and Settlements, for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order, and will 
have all the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.
Agreed security arrangements and coordination mechanisms are specified in Annex I.
A Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes (hereinafter "the 
JSC"), as well as Joint Regional Security Committees (hereinafter "RSCs") and Joint District 
Coordination Offices (hereinafter "DCOs"), are hereby established as provided for in Annex I.
The security arrangements provided for in this Agreement and in Annex 1 may be reviewed at the 
request of either Party and may be amended by mutual agreement of the Parties. Specific review 
arrangements are included in Annex I.
For the purpose of this Agreement, "the Settlements" means, in the West Bank - the settlements in 
Area C; and in the Gaza Strip - the Gush Katif and Erez settlement areas, as well as the other 
settlements in the Gaza Strip, as shown on attached map No. 2.
2 .
4.
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1. The Council will, upon completion of the redeployment of Israeli military forces in each district, 
as set out in Appendix I to Annex I, assume the powers and responsibilities for internal security 
and public order in Area A in that district.
a. There will be a complete redeployment of Israeli military forces from Area B. Israel will 
transfer to the Council and the Council will assume responsibility for public order for 
Palestinians. Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of 
protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.
b. In Area B the Palestinian Police shall assume the responsibility for public order for 
Palestinians and shall be deployed in order to accommodate the Palestinian needs and 
requirements in the following manner:
1. The Palestinian Police shall establish 25 police stations and posts in towns, villages, and 
other places listed in Appendix 2 to Annex I and as delineated on map No. 3. The West 
Bank RSC may agree on the establishment of additional police stations and posts, if 
required.
2. 'fhe Palestinian Police shall be responsible for handling public order incidents in which 
only Palestinians are involved.
3. The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in populated places where police stations and 
posts are located, as set out in paragraph b(l) above.
4. While the movement of uniformed Palestinian policemen in Area B outside places where 
there is a Palestinian police station or post will be carried out after coordination and 
confirmation through the relevant DCO, three months after the completion of 
redeployment from Area B, the DCOs may decide that movement of Palestinian 
policemen from the police stations in Area B to Palestinian towns and villages in Area B 
on roads that are used only by Palestinian traffic will take place after notifying the DCO.
5. The coordination of such planned movement prior to confirmation through the relevant 
DCO shall include a scheduled plan, including the number of policemen, as well as the 
type and number of weapons and vehicles intended to take part. It shall also include 
details of arrangements for ensuring continued coordination through appropriate 
communication links, the exact schedule of movement to the area of the planned 
operation, including the destination and routes thereto, its proposed duration and the 
schedule for returning to the police station or post. 
The Israeli side of the DCO will provide the Palestinian side with its response, following 
a request for movement of policemen in accordance with this paragraph, in normal or 
routine cases within one day and in emergency cases no later than 2 hours.
6. The Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces will conduct joint security activities 
on the main roads as set out in Annex 1.
7. The Palestinian Police will notify the West Bank RSC of the names of the policemen, 
number plates of police vehicles and serial numbers of weapons, with respect to each 
police station and post in Area B.
8. Further redeployments from Area C and transfer of internal security responsibility to the 
Palestinian Police in Areas B and C will be carried out in three phases, each to take place 
after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of the 
Council, except for the issues of permanent status negotiations and of Israel’s overall 
responsibility for Israelis and borders.
9. The procedures detailed in this paragraph will be reviewed within six months of the 
completion of the first phase of redeployment.
ARTICLE XIII; Security
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1. The Council shall establish a strong police force. The duties, functions, structure, deployment and 
composition of the Palestinian Police, together with provisions regarding its equipment and 
operation, as well as rules of conduct, are set out in Annex I.
2. The Palestinian police force established under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement will be fully 
integrated into the Palestinian Police and will be subject to the provisions of this Agreement.
3. Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be 
established or operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
4. Except for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestinian Police described in Annex I, 
and those of the Israeli military forces, no organization, group or individual in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip shall manufacture, sell, acquire, possess, import or otherwise introduce into the 
West Bank or the Gaza Strip any firearms, ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any 
related equipment, unless otherwise provided for in Annex I.
ARTICLE XV: Prevention of Hostile Acts
1. Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and 
hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other's authority and 
against their property, and shall take legal measures against offenders.
2. Specific provisions for the implementation of this Article are set out in Annex 1.
ARTICLE XVI: Confidence Building Measures
With a view to fostering a positive and supportive public atmosphere to accompany the implementation of 
this Agreement, to establish a solid basis of mutual trust and good faith, and in order to facilitate the 
anticipated cooperation and new relations between the two peoples, both Parties agree to carry out 
confidence building measures as detailed herewith:
I. Israel will release or turn over to the Palestinian side, Palestinian detainees and prisoners, 
residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The first stage of release of these prisonei s and 
detainees will take place on the signing of this Agreement and the second stage will take place 
prior to the date of the elections. There will be a third stage of release of detainees and prisoners. 
Detainees and prisoners will be released from among categories detailed in Annex VII (Release 
of Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees). Those released will be free to return to their homes in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
2. Palestinians who have maintained contact with the Israeli authorities will not be subjected to acts 
of harassment, violence, retribution or prosecution. Appropriate ongoing measures will be taken, 
in coordination with Israel, in order to ensure their protection.
3. Palestinians from abroad whose entry into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is approved pursuant 
to this Agreement, and to whom the provisions of this Article are applicable, will not be 
prosecuted for offenses committed prior to September 13, 1993.
CHAPTER 3 - LEGAL AFFAIRS
ARTICLE XVII: .lurisdiction
1. In accordance with the DOP, the Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip 
territory as a single territorial unit, except for:
a. issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: .lerusalem, settlements, 
specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis; 
and
b. powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.
2. Accordingly, the authority of the Council encompasses all matters that fall within its territorial, 
functional and personal Jurisdiction, as follows
ARTICLE XIV: The Palestinian Police
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a. 7'lie territorial jurisdiction of the Council shall encompass Gaza Strip territory, except for
the Settlements and the Military Installation Area shown on map No. 2, and West Bank 
territory, except for Area C which, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the 
permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in 
three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 
months after the inauguration of the Council. At this time, the jurisdiction of the Council 
will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be 
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
Territorial jurisdiction includes land, subsoil and territorial waters, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement.
b. The functional jurisdiction of the Council extends to all powers and responsibilities 
transferred to the Council, as specified in this Agreement or in any future agreements that 
may be reached between the Parties during the interim period.
c. The territorial and functional jurisdiction of the Council will apply to all persons, except 
for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement.
d. Notwithstanding subparagraph a. above, the Council shall have functional jurisdiction in 
Area C, as detailed in Article IV of Annex III.
The Council has, within its authority, legislative, executive and judicial powers and 
responsibilities, as provided for in this Agreement.
a. Israel, through its military government, has the authority over areas that are not under the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Council, powers and responsibilities not transferred to the 
Council and Israelis.
b. To this end, the Israeli military government shall retain the necessary legislative, judicial 
and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with international law. 7'his 
provision shall not derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over Israelis in personam.
The exercise of authority with regard to the electromagnetic sphere and air space shall be in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
Without derogating from the provisions of this Article, legal arrangements detailed in the 
Protocol Concerning Legal Matters attached as Annex IV to this Agreement (hereinafter "Annex 
IV") shall be observed. Israel and the Council may negotiate further legal arrangements.
Israel and the Council shall cooperate on matters of legal assistance in criminal and civil matters 
through a legal committee (hereinafter "the Legal Committee"), hereby established.
The Council's jurisdiction will extend gradually to cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, 
except for the issues to be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, through a series of 
redeployments of the Israeli military forces. The first phase of the redeployment of Israeli 
military forces will cover populated areas in the West Bank - cities, towns, refugee camps and 
hamlets, as set out in Annex 1 - and will be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, 
i.e. 22 days before the day of the elections. Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to 
specified military locations will commence immediately upon the inauguration of the Council and 
will be effected in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be concluded 
no later than eighteen months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.
ARTICLE XVlIl
Legislative Powers of the Council
1. For the purposes of this Article, legislation shall mean any primary and secondary legislation, 
including basic laws, laws, regulations and other legislative acts.
2. The Council has the power, within its jurisdiction as defined in Article XVII of this Agreement, 
to adopt legislation.
5.
6 .
7.
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3. While the primary legislative power shall lie in the hands of the Council as a whole, theRa'ees of 
the Executive Authority of the Council shall have the following legislative powers:
a. the power to initiate legislation or to present proposed legislation to the Council;
b. the power to promulgate legislation adopted by the Council; and
c. the power to issue secondary legislation, including regulations, relating to any matters 
specified and within the scope laid down in any primary legislation adopted by the 
Council.
a. Legislation, including legislation which amends or abrogates existing laws or military 
orders, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the Council or which is otherwise inconsistent 
with the provisions of the DOP, this Agreement, or of any other agreement that may be 
reached between the two sides during the interim period, shall have no effect and shall be 
void ab initio.
b. I'he Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall not promulgate legislation 
adopted by the Council if such legislation falls under the provisions of this paragraph.
4. All legislation shall be communicated to the Israeli side of the Legal Committee.
5. Without derogating from the provisions of paragraph 4 above, the Israeli side of the Legal 
Committee may refer for the attention of the Committee any legislation regarding which Israel 
considers the provisions of paragraph 4 apply, in order to discuss issues arising from such 
legislation. The Legal Committee will consider the legislation leferred to it at the earliest 
opportunity.
ARTICLE XIX: Human Rights and the Rule of Law
Israel and the Council shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement with due
regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law.
AR TICLE XX: Rights, Liabilities and Obligations
a. The transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its 
civil administration to the Council, as detailed in Annex 111, includes all related rights, 
liabilities and obligations arising with regard to acts or omissions which occurred prior to 
such transfer. Israel will cease to bear any financial responsibility regarding such acts or 
omissions and the Council will bear all financial responsibility for these and for its own 
functioning.
b. Any financial claim made in this regard against Israel will be referred to the Council.
c. Israel shall provide the Council with the information it has regarding pending and 
anticipated claims brought before any court or tribunal against Israel in this regard.
d. Where legal proceedings are brought in respect of such a claim, Israel will notify the 
Council and enable it to participate in defending the claim and raise any arguments on its 
behalf.
e. In the event that an award is made against Israel by any court or tribunal in respect of 
such a claim, the Council shall immediately reimburse Israel the full amount of the 
award.
f Without prejudice to the above, where a court or tribunal hearing such a claim finds that 
liability rests solely with an employee or agent who acted beyond the scope of the powers 
assigned to him or her, unlawfully or with willful malfeasance, the Council shall not bear 
financial responsibility.
a. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs I .d through I .f above, each side may take 
the necessary measures, including promulgation of legislation, in order to ensure that 
such claims by Palestinians, including pending claims in which the hearing of evidence 
has not yet begun, are brought only before Palestinian courts or tribunals in the West
100
Bank and the Gaza Strip, and are not brought before oi· heard by Israeli courts or 
tribunals.
b. Where a new claim has been brought before a Palestinian court or tribunal subsequent to 
the dismissal of the claim pursuant to subparagraph a. above, the Council shall defend it 
and, in accordance with subparagraph I .a above, in the event that an award is made for 
the plaintiff, shall pay the amount of the award.
c. The Legal Committee shall agree on arrangements for the transfer of all materials and 
information needed to enable the Palestinian courts or tribunals to hear such claims as 
referred to in subparagraph b. above, and, when necessary, for the provision of legal 
assistance by Israel to the Council in defending such claims.
1. The transfer of authority in itself shall not affect rights, liabilities and obligations of any person or 
legal entity, in existence at the date of signing of this Agreement.
2. The Council, upon its inauguration, will assume all the rights, liabilities and obligations of the 
Palestinian Authority.
3. For the purpose of this Agreement, "Israelis" also includes Israeli statutory agencies and 
corporations registered in Israel.
ARTICLE XXI; Settlement of Differences and Disputes
Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred to the appropriate 
coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this Agreement. The provisions of Article XV 
of the DOP shall apply to any such difference which is not settled through the appropriate coordination 
and cooperation mechanism, namely:
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Agreement or any related 
agreements pertaining to the interim period shall be settled through the Liaison Committee.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be settled by a mechanism of conciliation 
to be agreed between the Parties.
3. The Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which 
cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both Parties, the Parties 
will establish an Arbitration Committee.
CHAPTER 4 - COOPERATION
ARTICLE XXII: Relations between Israel and the Council
I. Israel and the Council shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall
accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other and, 
without derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, shall take legal measures to 
prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.
2. Israel and the Council will ensure that their respective educational systems contribute to the peace 
between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples and to peace in the entire region, and will refrain from 
the introduction of any motifs that could adversely affect the proce.ss of reconciliation.
3. Without derogating from the other provisions of this Agreement, Israel and the Council shall 
cooperate in combating criminal activity which may affect both sides, including offenses related 
to trafficking in illegal drugs and psychotropic substances, smuggling, and offenses against 
property, including offenses related to vehicles.
ARTICLE XXIII: Cooperation with Regard to Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities
In order to ensure a smooth, peaceful and orderly transfer of powers and responsibilities, the two sides 
will cooperate with regard to the transfer of security powers and responsibilities in accordance with the 
provisions of Annex 1, and the transfer of civil powers and responsibilities in accordance with the 
provisions of Annex III.
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The economic relations between the two sides are set out in the Protocol on Economic Relations, signed 
in Paris on April 29, 1994, and the Appendices thereto, and the Supplement to the Protocol on Economic 
Relations, all attached as Annex V, and will be governed by the relevant provisions of this Agreement and 
its Annexes.
ARTICLE XXV: Cooperation Programs
1. The Parties agree to establish a mechanism to develop programs of cooperation between them. 
Details of such cooperation are set out in Annex VI.
2. A Standing Cooperation Committee to deal with issues arising in the context of this cooperation 
is hereby established as provided for in Annex VI.
AR'flCLE XXVI: The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee
1. The Liaison Committee established pursuant to Article X of the DOP shall ensure the smooth 
implementation of this Agreement. It shall deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of 
common interest and disputes.
2. The Liaison Committee shall be composed of an equal number of members from each Party. It 
may add other technicians and experts as necessary.
3. The Liaison Committee shall adopt its rules of procedures, including the frequency and place or 
places of its meetings.
4. The Liaison Committee shall reach its decisions by agreement.
5. The Liaison Committee shall establish a subcommittee that will monitor and steer the 
implementation of this Agreement (hereinafter "the Monitoring and Steering Committee"). It will 
function as follows:
a. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will, on an ongoing basis, monitor the 
implementation of this Agreement, with a view to enhancing the cooperation and 
fostering the peaceful relations between the two sides.
b. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will steer the activities of the various joint 
committees established in this Agreement (the JSC, the CAC, the Legal Committee, the 
Joint Economic Committee and the Standing Cooperation Committee) concerning the 
ongoing implementation of the Agreement, and will report to the Liaison Committee.
c. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will be composed of the heads of the various 
committees mentioned above.
d. The two heads of the Monitoring and Steering Committee will establish its rules of 
procedures, including the frequency and places of its meetings.
AR TICLE XXVII: Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt
ARTICLE XXIV: Economic Relations
I.
j .
Pursuant to Article XII of the DOP, the two Parties have invited the Governments of Jordan and 
Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the 
Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives on the one hand, and the Governments 
of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. As part of these 
arrangements a Continuing Committee has been constituted and has commenced its deliberations. 
The Continuing Committee shall decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons 
displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measuies to 
prevent disruption and disorder.
The Continuing Committee shall also deal with other matters of common concern.
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1. Israel and the Council shall cooperate by providing each other with all necessary assistance in the 
conduct ot searches for missing persons and bodies of persons which have not been recovered, as 
well as by providing information about missing persons.
2. The PLO undertakes to cooperate with Israel and to assist it in its efforts to locate and to return to 
Israel Israeli soldiers who are missing in action and the bodies of soldiers which have not been 
recovered.
CHAPTER 5 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
ARl'ICLE XXIX; Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
Arrangements for safe passage of persons and transportation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
are set out in Annex I.
AR TICLE XXX; Passages
Arrangements for coordination between Israel and the Council regarding passage to and from Egypt and 
•Iordan, as well as any other agreed international crossings, are set out in Annex I.
ARTICLE XXXI; Final Clauses
ARTICLE XXVIII; Missing Persons
I.
9
4.
5.
6 .
7.
9.
10.
I I
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signing.
The Gaza-.lericho Agreement, the Preparatory Transfer Agreement and the Further Transfer 
Protocol will be superseded by this Agreement.
The Council, upon its inauguration, shall replace the Palestinian Authority and shall assume all 
the undertakings and obligations of the Palestinian Authority under the Gaza-.lericho Agreement, 
the Preparatory Transfer Agreement, and the Further Transfer Protocol.
The two sides shall pass all necessary legislation to implement this Agreement.
Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than May 4, 1996, 
between the Parties. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, 
including; .lerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and 
cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or preempt the outcome of the negotiations on the 
permanent status to be conducted pursuant to the DOP. Neither Party shall be deemed, by virtue 
of having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, 
claims or positions.
Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the 
Gaza .Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.
The two Parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity 
and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.
The PLO undertakes that, within two months of the date of the inauguration of the Council, the 
Palestinian National Council will convene and formally approve the necessary changes in regard 
to the Palestinian Covenant, as undertaken in the letters signed by the Chairman of the PLO and 
addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994.
Pursuant to Annex I, Article IX of this Agreement, Israel confirms that the permanent 
checkpoints on the roads leading to and from the Jericho Area (except those related to the access 
road leading from Mousa Alami to the Allenby Bridge) will be removed upon the completion of 
the first phase of redeployment.
Prisoners who, pursuant to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, were turned over to the Palestinian 
Authority on the condition that they remain in the Jericho Area for the remainder of their 
sentence, will be free to return to their homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip upon the 
completion of the first phase of redeployment.
103
12. As regards relations between Israel and the PLO, and without derogating from the commitments 
contained in the letters signed by and exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and the 
Chairman of the PLO, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994, the two sides will apply 
between them the provisions contained in Article XXII, paragraph 1, with the necessary changes.
a. The Preamble to this Agreement, and all Annexes, Appendices and maps attached hereto, 
shall constitute an integral part hereof.
b. The Parties agree that the maps attached to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement as;
a. map No. I (The Gaza Strip), an exact copy of which is attached to this 
Agreement as map No. 2 (in this Agreement "map No. 2"); 
map No. 4 (Deployment of Palestinian Police in the Gaza Strip), an exact copy of 
which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 5 (in this Agreement "map No. 
5"); and
map No. 6 (Maritime Activity Zones), an exact copy of which is attached to this 
Agreement as map No. 8 (in this Agreement "map No. 8"); 
are an integral part hereof and will remain in effect for the duration of this Agreement.
13. While the Jeftlik area will come under the functional and personal jurisdiction of the Council in 
the first phase of redeployment, the area's transfer to the territorial Jurisdiction of the Council will 
be considered by the Israeli side in the first phase of the further redeployment phases.
b.
c.
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